To Sikkim via Tibet: Eight drafts in diplomatese

The exciting behind-the-scenes story of how the tough Chinese negotiators came to accept such explicit language on Sikkim can only be really...

The exciting behind-the-scenes story of how the tough Chinese negotiators came to accept such explicit language on Sikkim can only be really understood when juxtaposed along with the ‘‘concession’’ that the Indian side delivered on Tibet.

In the mounds of jargon that comprise the officiously-named Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, there is one paragraph that refers to the Indian recognition of the ‘‘Tibet Autonomous Region (as being) part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities’’.

As draft upon draft was exchanged between the two sides, the Chinese sought to stare down the Indian delegation by insisting that New Delhi recognise Tibet as an ‘‘inalienable’’ part of China. Indian diplomats threw out the drafts outright, saying they were having none of it. In the end, nearly seven drafts were rejected before both agreed on the compromise formula: ‘‘The Indian side recognises that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is part of the territory of the PRC’’.

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The deadlock had been broken. With India using the same phrase as the one that the Chinese use for the Tibetan territory it controls with such an iron hand — ‘‘Tibet Autonomous Region’’ — Beijing now agreed to the Sikkim quid pro quo.

New Delhi had given the Chinese the opportunity to tell its people as well as the world that India had ‘‘finally and for the first time’’ fully recognised Tibet as being part of China.

On the face of it, it looked like a terrible trade-off, as if New Delhi had delivered the Dalai Lama as well as the thousands of Tibetans who live peaceably in India right to the mouth of the Chinese dragon. Noted Chinese strategic affairs analyst Ma Jiali pointed out that the Indian acceptance meant that the Dalai Lama would now be under ‘‘much greater pressure when conducting his autonomy talks with Beijing.’’

But External Affairs minister Yashwant Sinha strongly rejected accusations that this meant that New Delhi would now ask the Dalai Lama to move out of Dharamshala, where he had lived since March 1959 when he escaped from Lhasa. ‘‘India regards the Dalai Lama as a spiritual guru, a leader, and the question of his leaving India does not arise,’’ Sinha said, adding that talks between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese government was ‘‘between them’’.

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Nevertheless, the Indian side had clearly decided that if changing the ‘‘semantics of the reality on the ground’’ on Tibet was going to make such a difference to the Chinese side, so as to make the difference between a historic visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee and an anodyne one, then ‘‘nothing could be better for India’’.

Sifting through the statements on Sikkim made over time since 1954, New Delhi seems to have in one way or another acknowledged that Tibet remains under Chinese control. In 1954, in the agreement between Nehru and Zhou-en Lai, it was called the ‘‘Tibet Region of China’’; in 1958 it was said that the ‘‘Tibetan region is part of the People’s Republic of China’’; in 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, Tibet was called an ‘‘autonomous region of China’’, as it was in 1991 when Li Peng came to Delhi.

Officials also stressed that besides the reality on the ground, New Delhi was only accepting Chinese control over Tibetan territory that had been circumscribed in 1965.