Three parts to a whole

Military capability, if it has to be quantified for comparison, should be calculated on the basis of stipulated aims and objectives, the types of terrain, prevailing international environment, and our national policy. For each combination of requirements, different calculations are needed. It would be incorrect if all these different estimates were to be averaged out to give a single figure. Defence expenditure should not be based on averages, but on specific requirements needed to serve specific purposes.

A single service attempt to quantify superiority is inherently flawed. Wars and conflicts today involve multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional effort. The combined capability of the three armed forces should be taken into reckoning for each of the many different eventualities. That is the essence of Joint Planning, in substance rather than only in theory.

One limitation of the quantification process is that it is based on subjective assessments. Estimates based on subjective assessments should be used with great care in formulation of defence plans. Also, at times, numerical values are given to arrive at predetermined conclusions! A few years ago, we had tried out the Planned Programme Budgeting System (PPBS). It was found that the imponderables were too many, and the subjectivity in the analysis too prone to error for the results to be accepted with confidence. PPBS was discarded and rightly so, but it would be worth our while to understand the concept of PPBS.

Basically, PPBS looks at capabilities on an inter service basis against defined objectives, and analyses the cost effective method of enhancing the required capability. For instance, if greater punch in our offensive capability is needed, and, if supposedly, it can be brought about with either more tank regiments or by more ground attack aircraft squadrons, PPBS would examine both options to arrive at the optimum mix. The concept is of help in making value judgements on how best to upgrade desired capability.

The integrated defence staff has been functioning for nearly two years, but defence acquisitions are still based on an aggregate of single service requirements. Indeed, there is little evidence of joint formulation of plans based on stated objectives that should in turn guide and direct the acquisition process.

There have been numerous reports in the media concerning the high levels of revenue expenditure (moneys required to maintain the force levels), leaving little for capital expenditure, that is modernisation. Also, substantial funds earmarked for modernisation have had to be surrendered in the past, as the money could not be spent. Both these issues need examination.

Modernisation is an essential requirement as even limited state of the art capability has far reaching beneficial impact. Modernisation can be effected only if the revenue budget is brought down. That implies reducing the size of our armed forces in favour of a better equipped force. It is opined that the quality/quantity debate is now irrevocably skewed in favour of quality. Small quantities of state of the art equipment acquired at regular intervals will lead to much higher capability at similar or reduced cost, than the purchase and fielding of large number of less capable systems at much greater intervals.

We must retain the capability for large military offensives. On the other hand, for the next many years, we will have to contend with terrorism and low intensity conflicts. Cross border terrorism is not Pakistan’s problem but ours. Fielding a large force that stands guard over the entire border is not a cost effective or even an effective system.

Nowadays it makes sound military sense for the effective use of systems that have the inherent characteristics of speed of action, long reach, and near assured lethality. We should aim to seize the initiative and then retain it.

Our intention should be to have rapid action forces, backed by effective intelligence, to seek and hit the adversary wherever he might be. Capability intensive forces are needed with at least some such forces fielding state of the art equipment. This is probably the only way by which defence capability can be enhanced without increases in manpower or budgetary resources.

If the required capability is well defined, it would be relatively simple to work out the equipment and training needed. With good cooperation and coordination, the roles and missions for each service can be established. Defence purchases will then be against stated requirements.

To my mind, under these circumstances, there is little chance that major funds would have to be surrendered. The planned acquisitions would be arrived at after due inter service planning and analysis of operational requirements. Hence the nature and time lines of the acquisitions would be beyond dispute.

Variations of the type of thoughts enunciated above are possibly followed by individual services but certainly not on an inter service basis. When only individual service capability is taken into account, the adversary may appear taller than he is. His stature is considerably reduced when faced with the synergistic combined capability of the three armed forces.