This subcontinental shift

This policy pronouncement is the result of painstaking negotiations at official levels between the two countries spread over the last 18 months or so. Brajesh Mishra’s interaction with his US counterparts laid the foundation for these agreements. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal held discussions with US Under Secretary of State Mark Grosman and US Under Secretary for Commerce Kenneth Juster. Details of these agreements were negotiated in several meetings of the Indo-US high technology cooperation group. Final touches to agreements covering civilian nuclear cooperation and civilian space cooperation were given by a delegation led by Deputy National Security Advisor Satish Chandra which visited Washington this winter.

Indo-US relations have had their hiccups since 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests and also expanded its missile capacities. India’s disappointment over US involvement with the Musharraf government and wariness about Washington’s invitation to send Indian troops to Iraq did affect the evolving positive chemistry in bilateral relations. Differences of opinion on these points, however, did not affect the broad constructive orientations of Indo-US engagement, as is evident from this latest high-level policy statement on strategic cooperation issued simultaneously by Bush and Vajpayee. Factors which contributed to the process include the personal equation between the two heads of government. In addition, India adopted a generally supportive posture in favour of the US on a number of important policy decisions taken by Bush regarding national missile defence and theatre missile defence, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and US policies related to Asia. In turn, with Bush acknowledging the ground reality of India becoming a nuclear weapons power and its policy decision not to conduct further nuclear tests and abide by the non-proliferation export control regimes, differences of opinion on India’s nuclear weaponisation were neutralised to a great extent.

India’s pursuit of economic reform and liberalisation also evoked a positive response from the US. There is a deep convergence of interests between India and the US on countering international terrorism and religious extremism. Overarching these factors is the perception in the US establishment that in the post-Cold War era India, as a stable democracy based on institutional solidity, can be a more reliable partner in America’s policy objectives in the Asian region. This perception has translated into expanded economic relations as well as greater defence cooperation.

India’s initiative in restoring the dialogue with Pakistan has strengthened this perception about India as a rational and stabilising factor in the West Asia and South Asia regions which are in ferment due to recent developments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These positive trends have been backed up by continuous exchanges between the strategic communities and think-tanks in both countries.

The agreement between Vajpayee and Bush will result in American assistance in safety mechanisms for India’s nuclear facilities. It will lead to cooperation between the two nuclear regulatory agencies and joint production of civilian satellites. It will ease the unilateral licensing requirements for the transfer of high technology and dual use technology items for India. The negotiations also indicate an inclination on the part of the US to provide some kind of umbrella to India in tandem with the Indian Missile Defence Programme.

In this context, it is necessary to assess the implications of developing Indo-US equations. India would have to be sensitive and alert about reactions from Russia, China and Pakistan. Agreements with the US should not negatively affect India’s relations with China and Russia. One has to examine whether nuclear, space and missile cooperation will result in the US desiring some quid pro quo in capping or restricting India’s options to sustain its nuclear and missile defence capacities. Will these agreements increase America’s pressures on India to compromise with Pakistan on Kashmir beyond the thresholds India can reasonably countenance. India will have to tailor its export control regimes to conform to US standards which is not difficult. The question is, how fast can India do this without eroding its political autonomy in dealing with the issue?

America’s stance on not exporting civilian nuclear plants to India or cooperating with India on joint space launches is not going to change. Will there be indirect pressure on India to fashion its policies towards Iran in conformity with US apprehensions and attitudes towards that country?

India will thus have to carefully calibrate its policies on these issues.