This is about energy, did you say?

In view of the dust that is thrown in our eyes, it is important to bear in mind two different aspects of non-proliferation. One implication of the expression is that India will join others in ensuring that more States and groups do not acquire nuclear weapons. That is a desirable objective, an objective as vital for India as for others, and everyone subscribes to cooperation for this purpose. But, as we shall soon see, the US has a second meaning in mind too: and that is to halt, roll back, and eventually eliminate the nuclear weapons capability of a country like India. The US Bills make no bones about this at all.

• Section 2(6)(C) of the Bill notes that the agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister have signed, and which our Government has been saying does not at all put a cap on our nuclear strategic programme, “induces the country” to “refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program.”

Section 3(b)(5) clearly states that the US policy is to “Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.”

Was it that the Americans hadn’t understood what our Government was telling them? Was it that our Government wasn’t seeing what the Americans were doing in open daylight? Or was it that we, the ordinary folk, were being fed sleeping-pills?

Section 3(b)(7) has an even more far-reaching implication. It specifies that the US is to aim, “pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium,” to “encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.”

In a word, even before the general Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is finalised, the US will exert to get India to desist from increasing the production of fissile material.

Section 3(a)(1) specifies that the US objective in the agreement is to “Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

India is outside the NPT, and, as we shall see, US officials were declaring at every opportunity that it most emphatically is not a Nuclear Weapons State, and is not going to be accepted as one.

Foreclosing options

Indeed, the House Bill goes further. It binds the US not just to work for these objectives on its own. It binds it to close the options of India, should the latter, in the reckoning of the US, violate the provisions in this regard. Section 3(a)(3) specifies that the US Executive will work to “Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.”

Note, among other things, the requirement of consensus. China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Hence, assume that at some stage we are compelled by circumstances to resume testing. Assume further that some country pleads in the NSG that, in fact, we had good reason to resume testing, that there are extenuating circumstances. That pleading would not get anywhere until China also agrees!

Furthermore, Section 4(2)(d)(4) prescribes, “If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source.”

To ensure that the US Executive acquires the basis for such coordination — in the sense that it has at all times the fullest information about each item that it will urge others to stop exporting to India – Section 108(3) of the Senate Bill directs the US President to report to the Congress, among other subjects, on “any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries.”

Similarly, Section 3(b)(1,2) of the Senate Bill specifies that, with respect of South Asia, the US shall aim to “(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China (a curious insertion as China is no part of South Asia!) at the earliest possible date. (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the US and India become parties.”

The screws tightened

While we were being fed opium — “Amendments to the Bill have been defeated” — in fact a far-reaching amendment moved in the House of Representatives was accepted. It stands as part of the House Bill. This provision deploys an ingenious device to ensure that the US Government makes certain that we do not increase our weapons production. Section 4(o)(2)(B) of the House Bill lays down that in regard to India the US President shall present to the Congress every year “an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive devices.” Recall also that Section 107(a) of the Senate Bill binds the President to “ensure US compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

To gauge the effect of these two Sections, let’s put two things together — the spin our government has been putting on the agreement here and what the US is bound to do by virtue of Article 1 of the NPT.

We are being told in asides, “The agreement will not limit our weapons production at all. The uranium we are able to import for our civilian reactors because of this agreement will, in fact, free the uranium we obtain from our own mines for use in weapons production.” The House and Senate Bills close this imagined latitude decisively. Recall that reference to Article I of the NPT. This Article mandates every signatory State “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

Thus, assume that we get uranium from the US or other sources. Assume, in accordance with the spin, that we are therefore able to use more of our domestically mined ore for weapons production. The point will be immediately taken to the US Congress and the conclusion urged that to continue nuclear cooperation with India will violate this Article. Malignant consequences will follow straightaway.

We should also bear in mind that the Article imposes this restriction in regard to non-Nuclear Weapons States. It does not place any similar restriction on nuclear assistance or exports, say of uranium or any other material, by a Nuclear Weapons State, say the US, to another Nuclear Weapons State, say China.

Provisions of consequence

That these are not idle, vacuous statements, that they are not just expressions of sentiment, so to say, is evident from Section 4(o) of the House Bill. This Section lays down that, among the items on which the US President must report every year to the US Congress, are “(A) the extent to which each policy objective in section 3(b) has been achieved; (B) the steps taken by the US and India in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those objectives; (C) the extent of cooperation by other countries in achieving those objectives; and (D) the steps the US will take in the current calendar year to accomplish those objectives.”

Further, Section 4(b)(4) provides that the agreement will come into force only after the US President files a determination that “India is working actively with the US for the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.”

Not just that. The provision that follows adds another twist. Section 4(c)(2)(D) provides that, among the items on which the US President must report to and about which he must satisfy the Congress every year shall be “A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps that the US has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.”

Thus, (i) “India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons”, and (ii) it is to be “encouraged” to do so “unilaterally”.

The provisions tightened

The Senate Bill is equally unambiguous and explicit. In fact, it makes the conditions tighter. Section 102(5) provides that “any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the US and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimises the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximises India’s adherence to international non-proliferation regimes, including, in particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).”

Section 103(1) provides, “It shall be the policy of the United States with respect to any peaceful atomic energy cooperation between the US and India – (1) to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.”

Section 103(9) lays down “that exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian purposes.”

Section 108 makes it the duty of the US President to keep Congress informed “fully and currently” of “the facts and implications” regarding, inter alia, “(2) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date of the enactment of this Act; (3) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weap- ons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced; (4) changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.”

Section 108(5) specifies the items further. It requires the President to provide “a detailed description of – (A) US efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles” — pause for a moment, and read the words again, “disclosing, securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles”: and yet the Government has been declaring that there is nothing in what has been done since the 18 July statement which threatens to cap our weapons programme!

The words that follow reach even farther: India is to disclose, secure, cap, and reduce its fissile material stockpiles “pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.” In a word, the US is to work to get India to disclose, secure, cap, and reduce its fissile material stockpiles even before any such treaty is finalised.

The Section proceeds to require the President to report “(B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and (C) assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the objectives in subparagraph (A), consistent with its obligations under international law and existing agreements.”

Notice the expression, “unilaterally” in the House Bill. That is, we are to be encouraged to “unilaterally” agree to “stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons” just as we have been persuaded to “voluntarily” close CIRUS! “Curse it,” that astute Roman, Cicero, asked the assembled Senators as they succumbed to Mark Antony’s usurpations, “do you have to be voluntary slaves?”

Notice, next, in the Senate Bill, the expression, “pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime.” That is, we are to disclose, secure, cap, and reduce its fissile material stockpiles even before the FMCT comes into effect, in fact even if one doesn’t come into effect.

Finally, recall the reference to US’s “obligations under international law and existing agreements” – and the point that will be made about what the US must do under Article I of the NPT.

A voluntary moratorium converted into a binding restriction for ever

I well remember the caustic shrieks by which Congress spokesmen, having first denounced Mr Vajpayee for conducting the 1998 tests, then denounced him for declaring a voluntary moratorium on further tests. They cited the opinion of a leading scientist that India needed further tests. They invoked American barbs to the effect that, in fact, the tests had not just been inconclusive, one of them had actually failed.

There were two features about what Mr Vajpayee declared. First, what was declared was a “moratorium” — that is, a temporary suspension. Second, that suspension was a voluntary one: should the situation require that we conduct further tests, the decision to do so was kept completely within our hands. The later pledge to convert this into a de jure moratorium also envisaged that exit clauses — like CTBT’s “supreme national interest” — would form part of whatever instrument would be signed.

Through this agreement the US seeks to convert that voluntary, temporary suspension into a legally binding prohibition in perpetuity. This is evident from the US Bills. To their credit, officials of the US have been absolutely explicit, absolutely unambiguous about this. In her testimony, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, for instance, told the Congressional Committee, “We have been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguards is permanence of the safeguards, without condition. In fact, we reserve the right, should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the IAEA safeguard agreement to which it would be adhering, that the deal from our point of view would at that point be off.”

And this imperative now forms part of the Senate Bill. The Senate Bill’s Section 110 : “any waiver under Section 104 (the waiver that is required to allow nuclear commerce with India) shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.”

Thus, we are in effect to sign up on the CTBT, a treaty which the Senate itself has thrown out. We are to sign up on more than the CTBT as the prohibition on us shall be in perpetuity, without condition, while the CTBT explicitly allows a country to withdraw the very next day after it has signed up if its “supreme national interest”, as assessed by the country itself, requires.

Talk of parity!

(To be concluded)