‘The striking thing is how little India, Pak, with so much in common, know about each other ’

• In Lahore, a meal is like three…

It is absolutely (laughs)…Lahore is a great place. I have been to places like Peshawar and also to Muzaffarabad, but I had not been to Lahore.

• The Punjabis say that if you haven’t seen Lahore, you haven’t been born yet.

It was a great, memorable city, and I enjoyed going there. Anyway so I did all that and then I went on Wednesday to Kabul, which was snow-covered but feeling so much better. It’s the fourth time I have been there in the last three years. And it’s a poor country, what it has been. And real economic activity, sort of vibrancy…feeling much better.

• But it seems the meal you enjoyed most of all was in Amritsar, the Golden Temple…

(Laughs) Well the chapattis…

• I think our favourite picture was you rolling one.

Well, I don’t want the ladies of India to think that I have never seen the rolling pin before, except in my wife’s hand. I do a lot of cooking.

• I thought that was for the ladies in Blackburn (Straw’s constituency).

(Laughs) I do a lot of cooking.

• Politicians are all the same, constituency first. With elections coming up now…

Well, we are. And quite right too. Because, to make a serious point…when the Foreign Office wanted me to do a further visit, to do some other work, I said hang on a second, I have already got this job. Because I have got the job that the people of my constituency give me. And yes, it’s democracy. And I think one of the reasons why Indian democracy works and our democracy works is because we need to represent in both countries a piece of territory. We don’t have to pay our systems, you represent an area of land and population within it. So it is very direct.

• And that becomes a kind of microcosm of our country.

Yes, sure. And people always think, well, has anything that happens in my constituency, in Blackburn, got anything to do with what happens in terms of world affairs. But these things, these days, are completely interlinked. Most notably, for example, in respect of South Asia, if you’ve got 25,000 people of Asian heritage in your constituency, and half of them come from India and half of them come from Pakistan, you almost know something about Kashmir (laughs).

• You know when you set up that consular office in Mirpur, some people in South Block got very uneasy. But I thought at that moment you had found a neat solution for India and Pakistan. How has it worked since then?

The office is doing fine. I think it has helped, with a bit of luck, in the margins, to help relax a bit. But the really, really good news on Kashmir is obviously what the two governments have done.

• How enthused are you! Because your last few visits were very tense and we remember you standing with Jaswant Singh—one could see the tension on your face…‘That I hope this will work, I hope there won’t be a war next week’.

Well Colin Powell and I, as you would recall, were backwards and forwards to the region, basically to Islamabad and Delhi. And it was very tense. And we both felt that the countries were kind of sliding into a war, just in the way European countries went into war in July and early August, 1914 …

• That bad?

I think so. Actually, I could be wrong, obviously it wasn’t in the minds of the leaders then but the tension was very, very great. Since you all recall, there were belligerent noises on both sides. There was also, just to use the 1914 example, a degree of complacency on both sides, that if there was war, well okay, some people will be killed, but it would be quick and be over. Which was exactly what was thought in Europe in 1914.

• Was there one evening in that phase when you went home from work thinking that a war was very likely?

Well in May we really thought something could escalate. And it was at that stage that Powell and I talked about the action we will have to take in respect of our staffs. We had, almost completely, to evacuate the staff in Islamabad and draw down staff here. But we also—this actually turned out to be quite a key moment—we agreed to change our travel advisories…And I think it was that which probably gave a bigger shock to the system as a whole, because it was us, along with the European countries, saying that if you carry on escalating this way, which is your sovereign decision, just beware of the huge international long-term consequence.

• This whole idea of coercive diplomacy…you are a diplomat, how does it strike you?

I say that the danger of coercive diplomacy is that it sometimes can become coercion and not diplomacy, and there comes a tipping point. We were concerned to ensure that it stayed at diplomacy. And of course both sides found it extremely difficult, given the history of Kargil, of Lahore and of Agra, to have confidence in the other. In addition to that Kashmir is a sensitive issue here and it would be extremely hard for any government, of whatever persuasion, to make very large and immediate concessions. And in Pakistan, Kashmir is an existentialist issue. It’s the thing which has defined and distorted Pakistan politics, the whole of its history. So…

• Well it’s the one issue that has kept the military in power in Pakistan.

Of course, sure. And I was saying to a number of political leaders in Pakistan, if they want to look forward, to develop stable political institutions, a precondition for that is actually resolution of Kashmir.

• And also they have to leave a little bit of the past behind.

Well let me say both sides do…But what I say now is that the change in the last three years has been remarkable. And it is a very huge testament to the courage of President Musharraf and first of all Prime Minister Vajpayee and now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. And the foreign ministers Jaswant Singh, Yashwant Sinha, and Natwar Singh, and opposite numbers in Pakistan. But having gone to the brink, people pulled back, and there is now this complacent…

• Was there one time that you picked up the phone and asked people—on either side—this is going too far, stop it?

Well, we had more than one occasion here, and that applied to Colin Powell as well. I can’t say there was one day when it was worse than others, but in that period, the late spring period, we were very…

• We thought that there was one phase in the same month, between May and June, when suddenly there was a flurry of activity, and there was an announcement that Rumsfeld is coming in. Now he’s not somebody who travels from place to place, trying to put out fires. What words spooked you and Washington at that point?

It was the sense that…call it coercive diplomacy…that coercion was overtaking diplomacy. That was big problem. There comes a moment, if you take military planning too far, the military takes over. And Colin Powell of course, as a very distinguished soldier, 41 years of experience in the American army and one of the distinguished diplomats, was acutely aware of this. I am acutely aware of this. Some of you pay huge attention to our collective history, how nations could stumble into military conflicts. But he was very well aware of it in terms of planning and, I don’t want to take the 1914 example too far, but it’s now famously said that it became a matter of railway time-table, but that wasn’t it. If you think about how we stumbled into war in 1914, I know of course of the rivalry between Germany and the United Kingdom, but it was an incredible war.

• It builds up as it acquires momentum.

Of course it does. And then, the decision-making shifts. Having been involved as a member of the British Cabinet…the decisions to take military actions…you can see this happening, through the cases. Kosovo and Afghanistan were very straightforward, Iraq was not straightforward and very controversial.

• At some point anger becomes the predominant…

But it’s also about, there’s a kind of inevitability about it. And it’s what one understands from reading history. But I say, if it’s also diplomacy, you’re taking part in these decisions, you have got to be very, very well aware of the fact that everyone’s propensity to violence is quite high.

• In fact I remember one thing Vajpayee said at that time, something very touching: ‘The problem with starting a war is that you never know how it will end and you never know when it will end’. So I think there were concerns this side as well.

Of course there were concerns, for sure. I don’t doubt that for a second, that Vajpayee and his government were in any sense being belligerent themselves. The problem is you can get sucked into a circumstance…it happens to people. You are right, the easy thing about war is starting it, the more difficult is finishing it. The only certainty about war is innocent people get killed on both sides.

• What a turnaround now!

It’s fantastic. Statesmanship means courage and vision. And both the Indian Government and Pakistan government have shown both courage and vision, I mean real statesmanship. When I talk to Pakistani friends, I said very publicly this week, these peace processes can be very frustrating. We don’t think this all is going to fall into place. Look at the process taking place in Northern Ireland. There are fits and starts, people behave badly. The IRA, Sinn Fein, are at the moment, with this bank robbery…But just bear in mind that a process, however tentative or haunting it is, it’s infinitely better than the alternative, which is people killing each other. And that’s what I think we are getting there. Then the other crucial thing, I think both governments have understood this now that if you want a process, you’ve got to start with the easy things. The most difficult issue, in any of these processes, is about territory.

• That was a big difference between India and Pakistan in the past. You have spoken to Pakistanis in fact immediately after Natwar Singh’s visit. Do you see a greater degree of realism there?

I think that they understand that Confidence Building Measures are not just a phrase in the diplomatic textbook, but they are literally about building up the confidence of the publics, as well as of politicians and diplomats. And if you are going to build up the confidence, you have got to start with the straightforward things. The things which can have most, huge symbolic and practical importance. Like cricket…cricket is in the bloodstream of both sides.

…If the core issue is Kashmir, why can’t it be avoided in a composite dialogue? Say, both sides appear to have agreed that whenever there’s a discussion about Kashmir, the issue of the Line of Control and what to do about territory has to be something that can only be discussed in much easier times…

• I think there’s a big temperamental difference between the way India conducts its diplomacy and politics and the way Pakistanis do.

But the striking thing about India and Pakistan is how little each of these countries, which have got so much in common, knows about the other. That has led to mistakes in the past.

• Do you see that now as well?

Well, it’s changing. Because of the process, the building of confidence, but if you think about the histories of 1947, of close border wars…and particularly since 1989…and this real fear of being attacked and overwhelmed by a much larger neighbour in Pakistan, and on the other side, huge anger about terrorism that has come across…and subversion across the LoC, and all of that, and the fact that innocents have been slaughtered here, as well as of course on the other side. But I say it’s certainly the low level of knowledge and understanding of each of the societies, the way they have developed, which is very striking for someone like me, who lives with both communities day by day…If in any situation you want to resolve a conflict you’ve got to start to understand the other side. That is what is not happening.

• How significant is the latest development, after Natwar Singh’s visit to Pakistan? The decisions taken?

Decisions are very good in my judgement, and I think both sides have shown considerable flexibility. As you build up confidence, the positions which were previously thought to be very difficult…for example on documentation, it was difficult for both sides. And I also say this that the decision by the Indian Government to not insist on any external conditionality in respect of the negotiations for an oil pipeline…

• It was a big-hearted decision.

Yes it is, and I think it should reap real benefits. It harks back to my Marxist past—there’s no question about it, that with economics coming to politics, there’s more…

• What are you telling the two sides now, apart from saying stay the course?

Besides stay the course, I am saying look at the experiences of other peace processes, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and others. They are halting, difficult. There are big frustrations, but the longer they last, the longer it will last.

• Is there a way for you to incentivise this process? For you and America?

We have got to be careful about this. India and Pakistan are two sovereign states…because of our history, we can’t presume to influence except when we are asked.

• But if we take the example of Egypt and Israel, that process was incentivised.

We have to be very careful on that analogy. Because there are certain sensitivities in both Pakistan and here about frankly being told about what to do, either by the leader of the Old Empire or the leader of one of the New Empires. But we can work behind the scenes and give encouragement. The greatest incentive is the most obvious one: that there will be increased prosperity and a fewer people being killed…

• Are you and Washington on board on this?

We work very closely together. The first time I saw Colin Powell after becoming Foreign Secretary—getting on to four years now—I raised Kashmir with him, that we need to do some joint work. This was in June 2001. It had been a long-standing interest and concern of mine and I felt that things were not getting anywhere. I didn’t know, of course, that suddenly, on Christmas Day 2001, Colin Powell is going to phone me—in between my serving the main course and serving the pudding—that the whole Kashmir issue is suddenly going to flare up…

• Is this enthusiasm shared by Washington now?

Yeah, yeah. I have talked to Condoleezza Rice about this, before she became the Secretary of State and many times later.

• Let me switch geographical location a bit. Talking about historical distrust, one side not knowing the other…India and Pakistan is one thing, but what about America and Europe…?

Yes, it’s a bit absurd. I think Condoleezza Rice made some interesting points in the speech she made in Paris…

• … asking for a new beginning, a new chapter…But it’s not working.

But it’s drawing attention to the fact, particularly with France, which she is concerned with, a country which had great difficulty in coming to terms with America. France and America shared a common past, a common ideology, actually against Britain…That’s what’s very odd, if you look, their points of connection are very much greater than their points of dispute. Dispute arises because of America’s apparently disproportionate military power. That’s partly a fault of the Europeans. We and France are the only countries that spend anything like serious money on defence. If the rest of Europe wants the EU as a whole, NATO as a whole to play a serious role worldwide, it’s actually got to put its money where its mouth is.

…Yes it has gone too far, on both sides. I think we all recognise the divisions which occurred over Iraq two years ago have to be healed. It’s why I worked so hard with my French and German counterparts on the Iran dossier. It’s important in any event but…

• But you are engaging with Iran…just as we are. How do you look at our engagement now?

Your engagement is extremely important with Iran. Really, really important.

• Is it important in a good sense?

Sure, sure. India is emerging as a big global player in diplomatic affairs as well as economic. I have talked before to the Indian Government on Iran, and India has played a very constructive role behind the scenes…The more we are able to relax the situation in Iran, the more likely we are to get sensible decisions out of the Iranian government.

• This reminds me of something Henry Kissinger said on this show sometime back. He said Europe has a problem because Europe invented the idea of the nation-state but has now junked it and a new entity has not come in. Only nation-states have foreign policies, this EU doesn’t have a foreign policy. Secondly, in the absence of the idea of a nation-state, in foreign policy you look for an ideology, and that ideology is now anti-Americanism. Do you feel that way?

No I don’t…The nation-state is absolutely fundamental to the EU, though it’s a different kind of supernational organisation. It is a Union of nation-states, number one. Number two, because we are a bit more extra-dependent, the nature of sovereignty is changing. On the issue of foreign policy, right in theoretical terms, the nation-states can deliver, foreign policy and peace. This is also the (observation) of Professor Michael Howard in that wonderful thesis called The Invention of Peace.

But in terms of European foreign policy, Europe can make a difference. And we see that most notably in respect of Ukraine, where we were able to pull together rather disparate interests in Europe…Kissinger will remember divided Europe led to disaster in the Balkans. We have learnt that, and the Americans had to sort it out. We have learnt that lesson.

• Do you see positive movement in America-Europe relations?

I think America-Europe relations will remain difficult for quite a period, looking long term. Partly because both America and Europe have to come to terms with the fact that we are increasingly going to live in a multipolar world, in which India and China are going to emerge second- and third-largest economies.

• Let me ask you a double question. India-Pakistan situation, Europe-America situation, where do you find positive energy more pronounced? Which one do you see settling than the other?

Oh they are completely different. India, Pakistan are potential military conflicts. I pray to God that it can now be settled in a peaceful way. I am optimistic about that because both societies are coming to terms with the fact that they have got no interest in resolving it by conflict. America, Europe will settle down. Since November 2 last year, when President Bush got re-elected, it started to settle down. Even in terms of coming to terms with reality.