The right incentive for CTBT

Some people have argued vehemently that we need more tests either because we must have only thermo-nuclear weapons or because of other technical reasons. Others have disagreed. The finer points of such debates are important. But what the decision-makers need to understand is that signing the CTBT would place legal limits on the type of warheads (its weight-to-yield ratio, and the amount of weapon-grade material required for a certain level of arsenal) India could deploy at a future date. But there is no reason to believe that such a step would come in the way of a credible minimum deterrent with warheads of up to around 200 kiloton yield (the Hiroshima bomb was a 15-kiloton one) even if we signed the treaty.

But an adverse balance in the quality (or quantity) of warheads by itself does not come in the way of ensuring the credibility of our deterrence. Such factors may or may not have an influence on fighting a war with nuclear weapons. But where the aim is to simply deter another country from using nuclear weapons against us, as is the objective in our case, the equation is not composed by numbers of nuclear weapons or even their yield and quality. Horrendous destruction unacceptable to all types of leadership can be caused by weapons of the type for which we have demonstrated capability. Ideally we should carry out more tests so that we can ensure thermonuclear warheads of the type we might need and have the assurance that they will work to specifications. How many should they be? The range could vary from 45 to hundreds! But the realities of the current geopolitical situation is that any nuclear test by any country would invite severe penalties, far outweighing, in most cases, any advantage seen in upgradingthe quality of nuclear warheads by testing. We have declared a moratorium on testing, which could be set aside by our sovereign decision. But then we can also withdraw from the CTBT on grounds of national interest.

The central issue is that accepting legal treaty obligations not to test in future would certainly place restraints on future policy especially in limiting the quality of warheads and the quantity of material needed to produce the requisite arsenal. Punitive measures are in place in spite of the fact that we did not violate any treaty or obligation. The question, thus, is (and ought to be): why should India accept such legal restraints? What are the incentives? One is that it would remove an irritant in our relations with other countries. Is this enough? Even so, there is equal risk that some of them then would demand that India sign the NPT (as a non-nuclear state) as sought by UN Resolution 1172. Providing a face-saving formula to Western states would be logical if they are also willing to bring greater realism into their policies toward India. A UN Security Council seat in return for a CTBT signature is a pie in the sky. Would removal of sanctions qualify as a reasonable incentive? But many of these aremandated by national laws, especially in the US. Living from waiver to waiver (if they are forthcoming) may not be the best way of building future relations with such countries. What then would qualify as adequate incentive for India to sign the CTBT?

Our national interests require that the negative impact of the measures taken before and consequent to the nuclear tests be minimised, if not entirely eliminated. For that to happen, the international community will need to deal with India on the basis of ground realities rather than unilaterally declared self-serving goals. This means acceptance of the reality of India’s nuclear weapons even if no "recognition" is given to this capability. After all, signing the otherwise moribund CTBT would amount to treaty obligations to cap our future capabilities. Hence the incentives for India must be commensurate with what we are expected to give up. These might have been lower if the CTBT was anywhere near entry into force. But at this point there is no chance of that. The US Senate rejected it last year. Russian Duma has approved it subject to many conditions. China has yet to ratify it and can be expected to now link it to BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) issues. Even for India BMD issues (in spite of the failure ofthe recent test) will also have to be factored into in any arms control measure like the CTBT. The likely collapse of arms control framework due to these issues might tempt us to stay away from CTBT. But it would be better to exploit these developments with the leverage of negotiating our signature.

Many possible incentives can be identified. But the most logical route then would be to open nuclear trade and technology to India in the peaceful sector on the same basis as that conducted with nuclear-weapon states. For example, access to set up nuclear power reactors would go a long way in reducing emerging power shortage in India. Our plan to build up nuclear power to 20,000 MW level by 2020 can be expedited by infusion of foreign capital and technology. The power reactors would naturally be under IAEA safeguards. But all nuclear facilities would not be brought under "full-scope" safeguards. There is no international treaty which bans such access. Only the "guidelines" specified by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of Western democracies) come in the way. These can be easily modified by the group if they wish to. Such an arrangement would be based on the existing ground realities without formalising India’s nuclear-weapon status, and a potentially acceptable compromise by both sides. The ball is in the courtof the G-7 who can make a consensus to sign the CTBT possible in India.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh is director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi