The K-word bind

It is time perhaps to forward a new litmus test to assess Indian foreign policy. Here is the test: what shade of red do the faces of foreign policy makers turn on the mere mention of Kashmir by a Western leader? How flustered do they get when the leader of the lonely superpower utters those two syllables? If exertions by the White House staff on a diplomatic faux pas by their boss this weekend are anything to go by, the prognosis is fine indeed. Certainly, US President Bill Clinton’s comment on a prospective role for the US in resolving the Kashmir problem is said to have thrown Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s delegation into a tizzy too. Two almost immediate developments, however, affirmed the emerging terms of engagement between the two countries. One, the quick admission by Indian officials that while Kashmir per se was not on the agenda for Vajpayee-Clinton talks, it could figure in the context of Indo-Pak relations. Two, the equally prompt clarification by their American counterparts that theirpresident’s pre-summit remarks in no way heralded a retreat from the bilateral understanding fostered during his March visit to the subcontinent.

This begs the question, why are Indians so afraid of the K-word being mentioned in international fora? Ditto for that related I-word, internationalisation. These fears could have been rationally explained in the mid-nineties — for example, when Clinton himself famously clubbed Bosnia and Kashmir — when residual Cold War distrust and a still robust US-Pak strategic engagement evoked fears of borders being redrawn. But post-Kargil, they make little sense. In fact, it can be argued that internationalisation would be in India’s interest. Post-Lahore it is clear that even the grandest and most accommodating of gestures by New Delhi will not elicit from Islamabad matching sincerity; hence other spheres of influence have to be tapped if Pakistan is to be persuaded to give up its ever increasing support to cross-border terrrorism. Significantly, with last summer’s 50-day war rendering Kashmir almost synonymous with nuclear flashpoint, the international mainstream is incredibly wary of any attempt to redraw bordersin South Asia. Take, for instance, the first component of Clinton’s four-R recipe for a more peaceful and tranquil subcontinent: respect for the Line of Control.

It is against this backdrop that the success of the Vajpayee visit in addressing the Pakistan-sponsored violence in Kashmir and other parts of India must be measured. First, the prime minister’s repeated emphasis on the untenability of Pakistan-choreographed acts of violence marks a mature departure in that India has finally acknowledged this problem with no name. Second, the joint statement issued by the two leaders reflects New Delhi’s fruitful endeavours in developing a consensus on this — the statement lays great stress on "the unacceptability of continuing violence and bloodshed" in South Asia. India and the US are also to convene a meeting in New Delhi to discuss ways and means to counter terrorism. While for India this is just the first step in building an international coalition to exert pressure on Pakistan, it is telling that the K-word has not been scripted in any of this. That’s fine, but even if it had been, it would have been no bad thing.