The army needs the media

When the Samba “spy scandal” erupted in 1978 the media stood aloof and just “reported”. Had any editor given the nod for a spot of investigative reporting the careers and lives of a over a dozen young men would not have been ruined. Neither would the army’s image have been sullied.

Now see the changes in the army and its environment since Gill passed out of Chetwode Hall in mid-1950s as a commissioned officer. Soldiers were then equipped with .303 bolt-action rifles with which we tried to take on the Chinese. Now even the 7.62 self-loading rifles are outdated. Sophisticated state-of-the-art surface-to-air missiles in our and the adversary’s inventory make us talk of air space management. Electronic warfare has given new meaning to combat. The buzzword in security circles is deterrence and how to operate within a defined threshold.

Proxy war as the new challenge to national security saw the army being flung headlong into the pit to pace the kind of insurgency that has afflicted Kashmir for over a decade. Fighting with one hand tied to the back, the army really became the target of attack when militants engineered situations resulting in excessive use of force. With the involvement in counterinsurgency multiplying, the army found its “fatigue” index rising. With no discernible results on the ground and the people further alienated, the end result was doubly frustrating.

To reduce the flak that it often got for “human rights violation” — despite utmost restraint — the army found in the media an independent and credible force to portray the reality. That’s when the army also discovered that the media is a good partner to help in winning the hearts and minds of the people and cannot be shooed away in situations involving internal security.

Contrast the tragic operation Blue Star in 1984 with the later operation Black Thunder conducted under full media glare. In spite of serious contradictions in approach at various levels, the Hazratbal siege in 1993 passed off peacefully because the media had full access to the scene and was constantly briefed.

These lessons were soon to be unlearnt during the unfortunate Chrar-e-Sharif fiasco in 1995. A virtual media vacuum gave rise to all sorts of wild rumors and Pakistan stepped in gleefully with its propaganda machine. The army lost considerable goodwill built over years as a result.“The general lectured the Capital’s press corps as if they were fresh recruits to the NCC,” is how a senior journalist described the damage-control effort that followed.

During Gill’s time discussing the media and politics in the officers’ mess was taboo. But today when a second lieutenant passes out of the portals of IMA he has already been run through a capsule on media. Because the media understands firsthand news which is timely and credible, it cannot wait for pedantic MOD briefings. That’s why even senior officers are now being put through a media capsule at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication.

The brief is clear. Either feed the press or face the consequences of disinformation in this age of instant communications. Today, information warfare is an adjunct to war and proxy war.