That war-like stench all over again

They killed the wives and children of Indian army soldiers deployed on the borders. The message was clear: if the militants could target Indian army families in their homes, the Indian soldiers at the Line of Control could hardly deter them.

Chances of a war was predicted by American CIA chief George Tenet in March. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated, ‘‘If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack.’’

If the militants wanted to deflect attention from the heat of allied forces taking on the al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, they’ve succeeded. The fight that began in Kabul in September last year triggered by militants flying planes into the Twin Towers has every possibility of turning into a fight for Srinagar, triggered by militants determined to provoke an Indo Pak clash.

A critical error by the international community was the conclusion that a military dictator could defuse tension between India and Pakistan or prevent the rising tidal wave of extremism. The second error was the inability to distinguish between indigenous regional conflicts and terrorism. The Middle East flared up when Israeli premier Ariel Sharon exploited changed global perceptions to invade the Palestinian Authority. Now India is in danger of doing the same. Indeed, the post September world is one that’s more conducive to armed solutions than to political ones.

Musharraf, the great white hope in the fight against terrorism, is sinking in a quicksand of his own making. His tenure is marked by the rise of extremism, militancy, terrorism and regional tension. He missed the opportunity at Agra in July 2001 to sign a confidence building treaty with New Delhi. He carries the baggage of being the architect of the Kargil conflict that nearly led to an Indo Pak war in 1999. His lone ranger politics pits him against domestic political forces polarising the country. It’s therefore unlikely that dialogue proposals can halt the inexorable march to war.

There is one way the prospect of war can be prevented: a change of regime. This can come about by the officer corps of the Pakistan Army — they can ask Musharraf to resign and allow a new government to initiate confidence building measures and a dialogue with a clean slate.

There is a precedent to this demand: in 1971, the senior officers of the Pakistan Army went to the then military dictator, General Yahya Khan who also wore the cap of Army chief, asking him to resign. Yahya did, facilitating the formation of a new government that picked up the pieces. It signed the Simla Agreement in 1972 which held peace in place until both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998. Since 1998, the two countries have thrice come to the brink of war.

Reports indicate that the corps commanders do speak up. They opposed the April 30 referendum. They will debate a two front war at a time when their men are stretched out both at the eastern and western borders. The view of Pakistan’s important and powerful ally, America, is pivotal too. The White House was vocal in its support for General Musharraf. President Bush called him ‘‘my friend’’. Now it will have to choose between a man considered a friend and risking a limited war that could get out of hand.

New Delhi will reflect before starting a military action which lacks the support of the U S. But it enjoys far greater freedom of action than Islamabad had during the Kargil fighting. Then, President Clinton could dictate to a debt-ridden Islamabad that was held hostage by the International Monetary Fund. President Bush might find it difficult to dictate to New Delhi. New Delhi’s economy is largely independent. If there’s one weapon Bush has in his hand that can deter New Delhi, it’s the threat of international mediation over Kashmir.

A military setback could cook Musharraf’s goose. It’s far better for him and the region that he agrees to a regime change to prevent the start of armed hostilities that could trigger a nuclear nightmare. And it’s far better for New Delhi to accept such a regime change rather than allow a limited war that could spill out of control.

During his testimony before the Senate Committee last March, CIA director Tenet said the decision to turn Islamabad into an ally in the wake of the September 11 bombings was ‘‘a fundamental political shift with inherent risks.’’ Those risks are now evident as the South Asian region teeters on the brink of a violent tomorrow.