Talk away the flashpoint

We need to remember that higher the alert status and readiness to use nuclear weapons, the greater the risks of accidental launch, miscalculation and/or pre-emptive strikes. The obvious answer is to keep weapons in a de-alerted status and preferably with warheads and delivery systems separately stored. Conventional wisdom would have us believe that risk reduction should deal with accidents and accidental launch. The risk from accidents to the other country can primarily come from radiation and an international disaster monitoring system is invaluable. On the other hand, accidental launch poses serious problems. It is difficult to believe that mere telephone hotlines would serve any useful purpose in case of a nuclear weapon state suffering substantive destruction (of say, a city) as a consequence of that launch. Barring intentional use of nuclear weapons, the most important nuclear risk reduction measure would be to ensure that control over nuclear weapons is not lost due to whatever reason, and/or no weapons are launched due to miscalculation. The value of such assurances would be eroded where transfer of nuclear technology/material takes place to other countries or entities, and if rhetorical threats and statements are bandied about, as has happened in the past.

The greatest scope for confidence building and risk reduction lies in harmonising doctrines and strategies to the maximum degree possible. In this context, the idea thrown up by the external affairs minister, Natwar Singh, to explore a common approach to nuclear doctrines offers tremendous potential for greater stability and risk reduction. China, India and Pakistan are already committed to maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. Hence the basis of a common doctrine already exists, although no formal agreements should be expected. The definition of “minimum” will vary; but it would not make much difference as long as arsenals don’t shoot up to four-figure sizes.

China and India practically have a common nuclear doctrine that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and will not use them against non-nuclear weapon states. This has provided a powerful stabilising factor. But Pakistan-India doctrines are asymmetric. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons essentially to deter the use of India’s superior conventional military capability. Thus while it has not formally stated a doctrine of first use, it has also not committed to a no-first-use doctrine. But first strike posture requires ready to launch deployment of the nuclear arsenal on the highest alert with a complex and costly command and control system. Such deployments are an invitation to pre-emptive attack, in turn demanding massive arsenals for second strike. Logic would demand that instead of making the mistakes of the Cold War, a country could actually follow the Chinese example and still have an effective deterrent.

While the first use of nuclear weapons may be an option for Pakistan against Indian conventional military forces, a credible scenario where Islamabad would be willing to risk a retaliatory nuclear strike that could cripple Pakistan can exist only if Pakistan’s very survival is under serious credible threat. This is where the linkage of nuclear escalation and risks of possible use under crisis and/or conflict conditions with conventional and sub-conventional (read terrorist), or unconventional forces (as General Musharraf defined his strategy two years ago) assumes great importance.

Risks increase exponentially with the onset of armed conflict and its intensification, spinning out of control. Assumptions that low-cost bleeding or an adventure across the Line of Control denies the other side any viable option to respond with punitive force by now should have been jettisoned as counter-productive. New Delhi may have taken a long time to get down to it, but it is clearly preparing for application of military power below the nuclear overhang as much as Pakistan did in the summer of 1999.

Elementary logic would inform us that if the risk of use of nuclear weapons is to be reduced, the potential for armed conflict across its full spectrum must be drastically reduced if not eliminated. This in turn would require discussions on military doctrines, defence expenditures, conventional force reduction, and philosophy of use of force besides creating far greater transparency in military postures. Officialdom may not be ready to discuss, leave alone negotiate these issues. But they could agree to promote semi-/non-official discussions and expert studies some of which had almost been agreed way back in 1988-89 but have not progressed.