Tags:
Journalism of Courage
I did not discuss my intention to resign with anyone. I think it is a non-negotiable thing. On two to three occasions between July 20, 1987 and June 1988, I had the chance to speak in Parliament on Bofors. I remember saying that there is no such thing as Winding Up Charges8217; in contract law and that I had recommended that the contract may be cancelled if Bofors did not disclose the names of the recipients of bribes. The Congress was very offended when I said in my last speech in the House that the JPC was a joke because I was present when the deal with Bofors was concluded, and yet I was never called before it.
I remember having had two meetings in 1986-87. One was with Johan Adberg who represented the Swedish Government. He had come here for some foreign trade issue. There is a record of his presence in the MEA. Generally, I never met any representative of companies, but I did meet this gentleman, as he was representing his government. I told him that there must be no middlemen in this contract and thatthe cheapest gun would be preferred.
The LOI was issued with my permission. I have seen the note of A.V. Singh JSO forwarded by the Defence Secretary. I have also approved the same on March 13, 1986. On being asked about the haste with which the LOI had been signed by so many functionaries, prima facie, I would say it is a High Speed Decision8217; which is very, very unusual. I am unable to comment on the rationale for such high speed. It is abnormal.
Did Rajiv Gandhi meet theSwedish PM and give a commitment that we would buy the Bofors gun? I was not informed about this meeting, nor do I know about any such decision. In hindsight, considering that the LOI was issued immediately thereafter, I can visualise two possibilities. One, I was appointed in the MoD in 1985 with the instructions that I should organise that Bofors should get the contract. Second, that I was not at all in the picture and any manoeuvering in relation to Bofors was done without my knowledge. I was never told by Rajiv to opt for any gun and I did not give any instruction to Sundarji or the Defence Secretary to opt for any gun.
I am shown my note dated June 10, 1986 to the PM which I typed myself on my small typewriter. Since I did not get a reply from him, I thought that his silence was approval for me to go ahead with the work I was doing to get information out of Bofors. I did not receive any written instructions from him.
I never saw the PM8217;s note Knee-jerk reactions and stomach cramps will not serve anypurpose8230; to me because it was received in the MoD after my resignation. His note is very harsh. He has stated that I ad put my prestige above the nation. It is very sad to see such a comment because it is an utter falsehood.
Though I sent my note to him on June 10, 1987, till my resignation, that is until around July 20, 1987, I never got any reply. I am surprised to see such a note now in the file because Rajiv Gandhi8217;s note is dated June 15, 1987. I used to meet him almost every day after June 10, 1987 till the period of my resignation and the PM never showed his anger. It was only at the July 4 CCPA meeting that I came to know his view on the issue. Till then, I was of the opinion that we both shared the same view.
I do not remember whether I saw Gen Sundarji8217;s note on security implications. I think I had a telephonic conversation with him in which he mentioned that he was sending a note, but he had told me verbally that there was no serious security implication in case we cancelled thecontract.
Gen Sundarji told me that he had sent the note to the Defence Secretary and he had returned it to him. I told him that I had not given any such instruction. I called the Defence Secretary and he told me that it was the RM, Mr K.C. Pant8217;s instruction to return the note. As Defence Secretary, it was his responsibility to tell the RM what was right and what was wrong. If the RM or the Defence Secretary do not agree with the views of the COAS, they should write a letter to him. Asking him to take back his note is not the done thing.
Later, on July 15, 1987, in response to a letter from Serla Grewal, Gen Sundarji reissued the same letter following a meeting in my office. In the last meeting with the PM, I had mentioned that such instructions were passed from the MoD to the COAS. The PM told me that he had not given any such instruction.
Gen Sundarji came to me after I submitted my resignation and before I left office and told me that since I was aware of the procedure and all the evaluations whenthe contract was concluded, it was my responsibility to defend the reputation of the Indian Army. I told him that though I had resigned from the MoD, I was still a Member of Parliament and in any debate that occurred in the Rajya Sabha, I would say everything that was known to me.
Gen Sundarji had quoted me as saying that if I opened my mouth, the government would fall in one day. What I meant was that the atmosphere was so surcharged that any kind of rumour was being believed, and that because I had resigned, anything that I said would have carried credibility and therefore, if I had opened my mouth, the government would have fallen. Gen Sundarji had quoted this out of context.
If I knew Quattrocchi was involved, I would have stopped him. I do not think he could have wielded influence in the matter without the involvement of somebody in government. Since the information of Quattrocchi8217;s involvement has come to light, it sets me thinking as to who could be the link. I do not think Bhatnagar, by himself,could do this. I do not know the links of Gopi Arora with Quattrocchi. There can be two possibilities. Quattrocchi must have capitalised on his closeness to Rajiv Gandhi and applied pressure to expedite the decision. The second possibility is that Quattrocchi would have told the firms that he is close to the PM and that he would get the deal through and would have demanded payment once it was through.
It is not likely that any influence could swing the contract in favour of Bofors in the MoD without the influence of at least the Defence Secretary or the utter negligence of the MoD. The Defence Secretary was not known to be a negligent man.
From the day I joined the MoD, Arun Nehru had no role. He was MOS Power. He got Internal Security and I got Defence. I have seen the reports in the press about Ardbo8217;s diary etc. Arun Nehru was dropped from the Ministry around August/September 1986. He had a difference of opinion with Gandhi, his friend and relative. I cannot say whether they fell apart because ofBofors.
It is not correct to say tht I was scared to speak out because of the threat of security to my children. Irrespective of some differences between me and Rajiv Gandhi, we were very good friends. My children were as safe with him as they were with me. Once S.S. Gill, former Iamp;B Secretary, who was writing a book, called me and asked me to confirm the statement of Gen Sundarji that the lives of my children were in danger. I told him to write in his book that this was not correct.
Was there a quid pro quo between Bofors representatives and politicians and officials connected with the deal? I don8217;t know. To my knowledge, there was none. I am not aware of any party thrown by Bofors. At least, I have never been invited, nor did I ever attend.
Concluded
