The Valley needs a strategyA Few months before the Kar-gil conflict, a senior Army officer who visited the brigade headquarters in Kargil advised the field commanders to think ahead and devise ways to surprise the enemy by developing new strategy during the ensuing summer. Ironically, it was the enemy that succeeded in doing that by forcing a limited war in Kargil.Failure of our commanders to think ahead and to devise unorthodox plans has been a failing not just in Kargil but in most conflicts since independence. The government must share some of the blame since the responsibility for devising a policy and higher conduct of war rests with it and not merely with senior military commanders.Unfortunately, we still do not have an institution in place for formulating a viable military strategy at the government level. This, despite the need for such an institution having been felt during every crisis since independence, including the triumphant 1971 war with Pakistan. It is not known if anyconcrete steps have been taken of late by the defence services to include the study of higher military strategy in their training programmes. This has once again been pointed out in a recent book, Surrender at Dacca, by Lt. Gen. J.F.R. Jacob (retd), who was the Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, during the 1971 war. He observed that though our Staff College and College of Combat taught tactics and staff duties at brigade and divisional levels, no comprehensive strategic studies were undertaken at service headquarters and little importance was given to strategic assessm-ents in the event of national security contingencies.Lack of critical appreciation of the higher direction of war and a grand military strategy is reflected in the ma-nner in which most of our senior commanders are focussed. Various accounts of even the 1971 war bring out that even until the late stages of preparation for war, field commanders were made to work towards limited and time consuming objectives like the taking over of small towns.Finally what worked was the strategy to draw the enemy to the border and commit them to the defence of towns, which were then bypassed by using a subsidiary axis in order to head for Dacca, the nerve centre of erstwhile East Pakistan.In the months preceding the Kargil conflict, despite exhortations to think ahead, the truth is that our commanders in J&K were completely focussed on combating insurgents in the Valley and securing Siachen. This led to leaving the Kargil sector open to exploitation by the enemy. Notwithstanding the final result in Kargil, it is apparent that Pakistan worked to a grand strategy. It chose the line of least expectation, the Ka-rgil frontage, wh-ich had been silent for the past 27 ye-ars, to spring a surprise.Our success in Kargil, though commendable, needs to be analysed in the larger perspective. Since dislocation is one of the aims of strategy, the Kargil operations by Pakistan may have been another smart attempt in that direction in J&K. It has upset our militarydispositions, forcing us to distribute and reorganise our security forces. Specialised Army formations have been raised only for counter insurgency operations; some of these apparently at the cost of regular army formations.Besides, a new Corps headquarter has been raised in Ladakh. The exact operational exigency for raising a new Corps headquarters is not known. But some of these steps go against the well-known axiom of war that no worthwhile enemy will renew an attack along the same lines or in the same form after tasting defeat once.In J&K, Pakistan is indulging in guerrilla warfare in the typical copybook fashion. While tackling and neutralising militants on a daily basis, higher military commanders should be wary of inducting more and more Army troops without a larger strategy. In such low intensity conflicts, ratio of space to troops is crucial and as per the generally accepted calculations, a security post fortified by at least 20 men is needed for every four square miles. This, of course, couldvaries with the type of terrain, and other factors. Besides, what is crucial is the support of local people since guerrilla war though waged by a few is dependent on support of the many.Not that Pakistan has not faulted. It tasted humiliation, first in 1971 and now in Kargil. In both cases they did not take into account the likely response of the other side. But this does not lessen our worries. Besides overstretching our security forces, they are hell bent on internationalising the Kashmir issue. Unless we are able to put the enemy on the horns of a dil-emma and grab the initiative, we will continue to be on the receiving end. Undoubtedly, there are times in battle when a defensive strategy is more effective than an offensive strategy as Kargil was to prove.But Kargil was only a tactical victory and there is need for a grand strategy in the Valley. The effectiveness of armies depends on the development of new methods, including plans to paralyse the enemy through effective counter strategy.
