Inscrutable are the ways of the powerful, and the starkly contradictory US policies on non-proliferation at the present juncture has only added substance to this view. On the one hand, the US has been insisting on pre-emptive use of force, and according to the strategy proposed to the Congress, overwhelming force, against proliferation. On the other, is the kid glove treatment of North Korea which, according to senior US officials and other evidence, is a confirmed proliferator of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Credible evidence has also emerged from the US that Pakistan supplied nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in return for ballistic missiles for nuclear weapons delivery against India. At one end is the readiness to go to war against Iraq in the name of counter-proliferation, at the other end is the permissiveness in dealing with perceived allies. North Korean ballistic missiles supplies to Pakistan, Yemen, Iran and other countries have been central to the rapid spread of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in our region. In fact, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is believed to be more advanced than that of India’s, primarily because of the external flow of technology and material from East Asia. If known transfers of missiles and nuclear technology in the region are any indication, it is possible that a great deal more has been happening on the proliferation front than assumed in most cases. The question is how the international community led by the US responds to the challenge. The US, under pressure from Yemen, reversed its decision and asked Spanish navy to release the ship carrying SCUD missiles from North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea has threatened to restart its nuclear power reactors — which could produce material for weapons — if oil supplies promised under the 1994 agreement are not kept up. If the way the US handled the proliferation challenges that emerged into public domain during the past two months is any indication of Washington’s commitment to its announced policies, then the world is more likely to witness spread of WMD to non-state actors and terrorists in future. Proliferation of WMD (including missiles), and promiscuous response to proliferation, would only provide incentives for more proliferation either for defence or for offensive strategies.
