Shadowing Those Invisible Men

She started work on the book years ago when she did a series on the CINCS for The Post. ‘‘I had gone to the Pentagon to conduct an interview and chanced upon this map on the wall with little dots across the world. A little digging and it turned out that these were areas where the US Special Forces were deployed,’’ she told this reviewer. ‘‘What surprised me was that several of those dots were in countries where the US Congress had banned any military-to-military relations. While they were briefing, I kept looking at the map, doing my best to memorise the little dots.’’

Sample this. ‘‘When the Pakistani army staged a coup in October 1999, the Clinton administration sent a stern protest to (General Pervez) Musharraf,’’ writes Priest in her book. ‘‘A nuclear-capable unstable nation had plunged into fresh turmoil and Washington waited anxiously: How would Musharraf react? When the General finally responded to the US message, he placed a call not to President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defence Secretary William Cohen or the US ambassador in Islamabad. Instead Musharraf phoned (Gen Anthony) Zinni, who happened to be sitting with (Defence Secretary Richard) Cohen at an airfield ceremony in Egypt.’’ After due permission from Cohen Zinni took the call. ‘‘Tony,’’ Musharraf began, ‘‘I want to tell you what I am doing.’’ An interesting prelude to the US government anointing Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally?

Priest put together a story of how the US military was taking on a diplomatic role. ‘‘Indonesia became a case study in how persistent CINCs in the Pacific worked around Congressional and State Department roadblocks to maintain military ties.’’ While the US ambassador and his political counsellor in Jakarta were sending signals of Indonesian suppression in east Timor, Admiral Dennis Blair, CINC, Pacific Command, was busy ‘‘shaking hands’’ with the Indonesian military. Did it help? Probably not, as Priest writes, but it leaves several questions open. Like Pakistan, Congress had also banned Indonesia form receiving American training under the international military education and training programme. But the US military found a way. ‘‘The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programme… was peddled to Congress as a way to train US Special Operations Forces overseas. In reality, it allowed the military to train foreign troops from countries such as Indonesia, Colombia and Pakistan whom Congress had blacklisted.’’

Hopping continents, Priest travelled to hotspots to interview Special Forces, which have their own functional command, as well as a secret budget which is estimated to be a little above $4 billion. As the military ‘‘waged war and kept peace’’ — be it Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq — Priest kept track, highlighting the inherent dangers of an overambitious and at times confused military.

For Indian policy makers, this book offers several insights. Questions on why India will never be a part of Central Command, which has Pakistan in its purview, will be answered. Military planners charting the expansion of India’s Special Forces capability would have a lot to read. More important, while India seeks more military-to-military ties with the US, here are interesting chapters on those who did and continue to do so.