Pulling down Saddam Hussein’s statue was perhaps much easier than capturing him; but the phenomenon of Saddam Hussein is not likely to fade away in some nondescript jail. There is no doubt that he was a repressive ruler, but so were many before him in Iraq. American attempts at humiliating him may have been aimed at reducing his charisma. After all, many in the Arab world had come to see him as their leader, one who had first defied the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the US-led international community and then the military might of the sole super power. They would have expected him to go down fighting rather than hole up and then tamely give up and allow himself to be treated in an extremely demeaning manner. But Saddam Hussein also was the ruler who invaded Iran to the east and Kuwait to the south, even annexing the latter violating well established international norms which led to a war for Kuwait’s liberation and Iraq’s privations. What surprised the world was the way Saddam Hussein held on to power. Given the nature of things, most Iraqis would celebrate Saddam Hussein’s exit from any scope of even being a rallying point for power. But in some ways his capture also now lifts the lid from a violent struggle for power in Iraq, the signs of which are visible and the effects of which are being faced by the United States and its allies. Fighting in the name of regime loyalty may subside, but there are at least two dozen groups unconnected with the Saddam regime that are engaged in a bitter fight with the US-led occupying forces. Freed of the shadow of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi nationalism is likely to gain strength, exploited undoubtedly by those who seek to gain power in future. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Ba’ath party would cave in meekly from its pre-eminent position of four decades. If history is any indication, the dichotomy of Iraq in the need for a strong hand at the helm of affairs while a liberal society prospers below is unlikely to alter in any fundamental way just because Saddam Hussein would not be in command. So, while triumphalism may increase George Bush ratings and administration’s self-image at home, where the capture of Saddam might be seen as some sort of legitimacy for the war which has been lacking so far, the conflict in Iraq is unlikely to subside. America may now control Saddam; but it may yet be a long time before it controls Iraq. The rational choice for Washington would be to take some bold steps, bring in the international community to stabilise Iraq, and start the work of reconciliation seriously even if that would imply giving up some favourite policy preferences.
