Running with the bomb

Reasons for the low-key US response are believed to range from its current preoccupation with Iraq, its national interest in controlling the oil-rich Middle East, President Bush’s personal enmity with Saddam Hussein and deterrence offered by the presence of at least a couple of nuclear weapons in Pyongyang and their ability to reach South Korea and Japan where more than 40,000 US troops are stationed. Nevertheless, several issues may be raised.

The integrity of the NPT itself is threatened by the revelation that non-nuclear member states could engage in a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Despite being subjected to international safeguards, North Korea still managed to secure weapons equipment and technology. In fact, after the ‘Agreed Framework’ had capped its plutonium production, it initiated a uranium based weapons programme and the inspection regime could detect little. The North Korean case also demonstrates that nuclear deterrence holds even if the nuclear weapons with a country are crude and few. Iraq is only suspected of having the capability of building nuclear weapons, while North Korea is believed to have a couple of them, forcing the US to pussyfoot around the military option.

North Korea provides further support for the US rationale for theatre missile defences for its allies in Asia and Europe. Japan might still hesitate to acquire nuclear weapons of its own, but it would definitely intensify its search for missile defence and for a deeper US commitment to extended deterrence.

It could also be argued that in case an agreement with North Korea is eventually thrashed out, it shall once again exhibit the power of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in international relations. Most importantly, given the proven linkage between North Korean and Pakistani nuclear and missile proliferation, the impact on India’s regional security requires special analysis. It has been reported that within six months of the operation of North Korea’s Yongbyon reprocessing plant, the country could well become a plutonium factory, with nuclear material available for sale. In any case, Pyongyang is known to follow a variety of hard currency schemes, including missile exports, counterfeiting and narcotics trafficking. Pakistan has been a buyer in the past and in fact, their relationship demonstrates the expediency of nuclear barter between two impoverished countries.

All of the above impinges on India’s security environment. While the US perceives greater national interest in devoting its resources and energies to taming Iraq, India must forcefully highlight the nuisance value of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship and press upon the international community to resolve this crisis so that others do not reappear. Let not other countries conclude from this episode that nuclear brinkmanship works.