Read your Constitution, Dr Singh

The political facts were clear. The RJD, led by Laloo Prasad Yadav, had conclusively lost the election. The mandate was against the RJD. Even the Congress, along with the LJP, was part of anti-RJD camp. The NDA was the largest single group with 92 seats out of 243.

No one had a clear mandate. But the NDA could claim to be closest. On April 9, the 17 independents issued a signed statement declaring their support to an NDA government headed by Nitish Kumar. Nitish’s support had thus swelled to 109. He was only 13 short. Legislators of the SP publicly announced their support. He was now within striking distance.

Ram Vilas Paswan, president of the LJP, considered himself kingmaker. The kingmaker, however, was in a royal trap. If he supported the RJD, he would negate the very mandate he had sought. If he supported the NDA, it may have cost him his ministership in the Union Cabinet.

His confused talk made little sense to both parties. His legislators had by now realised that having contested on an anti-RJD plank, Paswan was a hurdle in the formation of an anti-RJD government. Understandably they decided to desert him.

Two-thirds of his legislators were required to break away and merge with any of the NDA constituents. A majority of the MLAs could have decided the future course of the entire party. The political churning had begun.

When the election produced an indecisive result, the assembly was rightly put under suspended animation. The objective was to allow the political process enough time and space. Repolarisation of political forces is not unknown to democracy. Suspended animation has twice produced a popular government in Uttar Pradesh. Only recently, political foes came together and formed a Congress-led government in Karnataka.

This process had started in Bihar. The Governor was dutybound to allow it to find a solution. But his conduct was coloured by collateral considerations.

He publicly announced he would not permit an NDA government. He started making allegations about ‘‘horse-trading’’ without placing any material evidence. He dragged himself to the political thicket. His fairness was suspect.

Within 48 hours of the political churning that seemed poised to produce a result, the Governor recommended dissolution of the Assembly. The Central Government accepted his report and inflicted another election on Bihar.

The action was a constitutional monstrosity. How can the possibility of formation of a government through realignment of political forces be termed as ‘‘inability to carry on the governance in accordance with the Constitution’’? What was the dying haste that this could not have waited for a more earthly hour, and had to be done in darkness?

This chapter embodies all that is wrong with the Manmohan Singh-led government. Firstly, as in Goa and Jharkhand, the Congress kept alive its tradition of unconstitutionality.

Secondly, vindictiveness and intolerance have been the hallmark of this government. A Nitish Kumar-led government would have irritated Laloo. Not only would he have pressurised the UPA leadership, he would also have pressed for action against Paswan, who after the desertion of his MLAs was losing political utility. A safe and self-serving course for Manmohan Singh then was to prevent Nitish Kumar from forming a government.

Sabotaging opposition governments even when they have a majority has been demonstrated by Manmohan Singh in Goa and Jharkhand. One more addition to this list would not make a major difference to the ‘‘decent’’ image he enjoys. How long will this ‘‘decency’’ be used to camouflage political impropriety?

Thirdly, it demonstrates the power ‘‘tainted’’ ministers wield in this government. The UPA has already lost support of 40 SP MPs. The 17 BSP MPs cannot be trusted since the Supreme Court is making the government’s task of going slow on Mayawati’s cases difficult. The loss of 24 RJD MPs would have reduced this government to a minority. The UPA thus had to submit to blackmail.

Fourthly, the role of political governors to subserve ruling party interests has been an important facet of this government. Ideological bias was proclaimed as a reason for removing the NDA-appointed governors. The Bihar Governor regularly informed the media that he would not allow any government to be formed by repolarisation of political forces. His tone and tenor demonstrated he was not merely protecting the UPA’s interests, but also an interest in sustaining personal power.

The executive authority of the Governor is diluted when a popular government takes over. Buta Singh is a pragmatic politician. Renunciation of personal power is not a virtue that can be attributed to him.

Fifthly, a weak prime minister is always going to be unable to resist unconstitutional conduct. He can be pushed around. He included the ‘‘tainted’’ in his Cabinet by switching from the ‘‘Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion’’ principle to his present belief of ‘‘presumption of innocence till guilt is proved’’.

He acquiesced to politically-motivated acts, from removal of governors to Goa and Jharkhand. He was unable to prevent his ministers from attacking the Supreme Court, which passed a legitimate order in the Jharkhand case. When the Election Commission was attacked, he could at best make a politically non-committal statement.

The re-emergence of Laloo raj in Bihar evidenced itself when upright civil servants were hounded out in Gopalganj and Siwan on the very day the prime minister addressed district collectors on the need for impartiality and security of tenure. He did not mind his economic reformer’s image being dented when he allowed his government to persecute a former minister of the integrity of Arun Shourie.

How long will the ‘‘decent man’’ image camouflage a series of indecent acts?

The author is general secretary of the BJP