I have watched with dismay the recent controversy in the media over participation and employment of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Kargil War. As this tends to bring the Armed Forces into political crossfire and creates differences between the Services—which are both not in national interest—I have refrained from speaking publicly so far. However, some conjured, distorted and fabricated stories and malicious personal allegations in the media have compelled me to write this clarification of events. It is well-known that I was on an official visit abroad when the intrusions were initially detected and reported by Headquarters 15 Corps and Northern Command. As reported to me later, they requested, and obtained, IAF transport helicopters’ support to carry out some inter-sector movement of personnel and stores in Ladakh and Kargil in the second week of May 99. On May 13 and 14, 1999, GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen (now retired) H M Khanna and GOC, 15 Corps, Lt Gen (now retired) Krishan Pal accompanied then defence minister, George Fernandes, to Partapur, Kargil and Srinagar. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), in which Vice-Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) Lt Gen (now retired) Chandra Shekhar represented me, met and discussed the situation on May 13 and 15, 1999. Due to lack of intelligence and poor surveillance at local levels, the operational situation was not clear. On May 15 and 16, 1999, I spoke to the VCOAS, Director General Military Operations (DGMO), on telephone, who informed me that Headquarters 15 Corps and Northern Command were handling the situation and they were confident of getting the militants’ intrusion (assessment till then was that the intruders were militants and not Pak Army troops) vacated with their own resources. On my enquiry, I was told categorically that there was no need to cut short my official visit. On May 18, 1999, based on fresh assessment of the situation, and after informing me on phone, the VCOAS, Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, sought IAF assistance in the COSC and Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for further surveillance and detection of the intrusions. This request was not agreed to/recommended by then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal (now retired) A Y Tipnis, on the ground that attack helicopters would not be able to fly at that altitude and that the use of air power would escalate and enlarge the conflict. Accordingly, the CCS did not allow the use of air power. On May 19, 1999, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis addressed a letter to me—with a copy to Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral (now retired) Sushil Kumar—which is now with Army Headquarters, stating that there was considerable misconception about the use/implications of air power. The COSC ought to discuss this issue and have a Standard Operating Procedure prepared for the purpose. On my return to India (May 20, 1999) and after visiting Headquarters Northern Command (Udhampur) and 15 Corps (Srinagar)—I could not go to Kargil due to bad weather—to carry out personal assessment, I was convinced that the IAF must use its air power. Accordingly, I requested Admiral Sushil Kumar and Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, my colleagues in the COSC, to discuss this issue in my office at 4 pm on May 23, 1999. After giving my assessment of the situation, I stated that the IAF should use its air power in the onflict and made it clear that if any of my colleagues was against it, I shall oppose that view in the CCS meeting. My assessment of the situation, however, convinced my COSC colleagues and a unanimous decision was taken to recommend the use of air power to the CCS. Next day, I briefed the CCS in the Operations Room, gave my assessment of the situation and told them what we planned to do. I also conveyed our (COSC) recommendation for the use of air power. The CCS approved this but made it clear that no one was to cross the Line of Control. There was never any blame game or accusation in this whole episode. Air Marshal Tipnis and I even visited and addressed our field formations together. It is wrong on the part of some mediapersons to give an out-of-context and wrong twist to some part of the Army Headquarters’ in-house report, which was written to keep a record of events and to draw lessons from. This part of the report, as I recall, brought out two lessons: (a) The need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integrated staff at higher level. (b) The need for the Army to control armed and attack helicopters. It is unfair for any senior retired Air Force officer, who was neither a member of the COSC nor a participant in the CCS deliberations, to be so self-opinionated and pass unsavoury remarks about the Army and its senior hierarchy without knowing the facts. Some journalists also carry strong prejudices that prevent them from acknowledging the facts! The fact remains that after the Pak initiative/misadventure, we were able to successfully strike back, fulfil the given mission despite the extremely delicate and difficult situation on the ground, and achieve a military victory.
