Putin the right perspective

Zbigniew Brzezinsky in his book, Game Plan, in the late 1980s talked of the world-view from Washington and Moscow respectively to make his point about how the two superpowers looked at strategic issues and each other. Although much has changed since then, geography has not. Implicit in the world-view from Moscow, and unstated by Brzezinsky, was the intrinsic commonality of the world-view from Moscow and New Delhi. It is this convergence that the Delhi Declaration in 1988 (and the one expected now with President Putin’s visit) sought to capture in the shape of guiding principles. But the end of Cold War since then, and the tentative emergence of greater probing for autonomous space for foreign policies even by American military alliance partners, has provided new opportunities.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the early 1990s, it is now clear that the 21st century will be an Asian century rather than one that belongs to the Pacific region. The most powerful state in the world, the United States, is now physically and firmly on continental Asia. China, Japan, India and Russia are increasingly influential in a world where the US remains the most important player. The European Union is increasingly engaged in Asia. In this polycentric world, the future will depend greatly on the relationship between the major powers of Asia, that is, China, India, Japan and Russia, working in new partnership arrangements among themselves, and with the non-Asian powers.

Strategic partnership with Russia, therefore, would be one of the multiple bilateral strategic partnerships (like India-China, or India-US ‘natural partnership’, etc) that New Delhi should be getting into rather than a trilateral strategic partnership between China-India-Russia.

In bilateral terms, the nature and content of Indo-Russian economic-trade relations would constitute the foundation and give substance to the strategic partnership.

And bilateral trade is one area which shows persistent decline during the past three years, making people wonder whether the two countries are serious about their relationship or are content with mere mantras. There are also opportunities in energy sector cooperation, especially in crafting a coordinated strategy for accessing energy resources of Central Asia. With the establishment of a military presence (including deployed combat aircraft) in Kyrgystan, Russia has expanded its military presence in Central Asia to support stability in the region.

The focus on oil and gas, and getting them to markets in Russia and India, would be obvious. But attention also needs to be directed toward other options like the potential of hydroelectric power from more than two-dozen possible sites in Kyrgystan. It is also time to make India’s access to nuclear power easier (with international safeguards) to boost the plans to build 20,000MWe by 2020.

The situation where the world, led by the US, appears promiscuous about Pakistan’s supply of nuclear weapons technology and material to North Korea, and denies India access to more nuclear power to assist human development, is incongruous to say the least, and must change.

There is an obvious convergence of interests in the battle against separatist terrorism fed on religious, especially jihadi ideology, whose epicentre lies in Pakistan. Putin has already cautioned the world about the risk of weapons of mass destruction from Pakistan diffusing into the hands of terrorist groups.

The struggle against religious-motivated terrorism will be a long one; and international co-operation is critical in this. The US war against terrorism has plateaued, and its focus on Iraq to the exclusion of more fundamental challenges to international peace, only re-emphasises the need for other major powers to strengthen the international coalition against terrorism.

The time has come for Asian powers to evolve a coordinating framework to tackle this menace since Asia is the larger victim, and the core of the cancer is also in this continent.

There is a tendency in both countries to see Indo-Soviet (and now Indo-Russian) relations in terms of defence equipment trade relations only. There is no doubt that this has been an important factor. But it must be remembered that the military-technical relationship is a product of the broader strategic relationship rather than the reverse. Secondly, the need to move from direct purchase and licence production arrangements to joint ventures in design, development, production and sales is obvious. Not only should the lost opportunities of the past decade be made up, but also greater progress needs to be made at a faster rate than what is visible.

Last, but not least, China’s military modernisation has received a dramatic boost from Russian cooperation. New Delhi would have to watch this carefully, and Moscow would need to be sensitive to Indian interests in this process. It also must ensure that there is no spin-off effect on Pakistan. Unfortunately, the cascading of Russian military technology and systems to Pakistan via China has already started to impact on its military potential.

Sino-Russian military-technical co-operation is a fact of life. But Moscow should ensure that its transfer of weapons and technology to China does not lead to adverse consequences for India.