One year after Pokharan II, what is the nuclear balance sheet? The explosion was a grand success at two levels scientific achievement and a demonstration of technical-industrial capability, considering the effort was one hundred per cent indigenous. The achievement was unprecedented this was the first time a government had completed its testing programme as planned initially.With the tests came the debate if it was wise to have conducted the tests before the much-promised Strategic Defence Rev-iew in the National Agenda for Gove-rnance formulated by the ruling coalition. To many, strictly going by the nitty-gritty of the wording, there was no such linkage. It read, inter alia, ``Towards that end (to ensure security, territorial integrity, and unity of India) we will re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons''. Thus the decision to induct weapons was regardless of the review and reevaluation.Ironically, the Defence Minister himself had stated otherwise. On May 3,in a television interview, he was reported to have stated: ``If those threat perceptions (from China and Pak-istan) are as one visualises them to be following the defence review, then you have no option but to exercise the option. If the review leads us to a point where it becomes obvious it is time now to exercise the nuclear option, then we will exercise it.''Even if it is accepted as a matter of interpretation or a diversionary tactic, the same cannot be said about the glaring error which appeared in a government statement, made by a top functionary on the first day of the blast itself, and that too on an issue of no less significance than the CTBT. It was safer that ``India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty''.The statement also pointed out that the offer was subject to negotiations. Completely oblivious of the fact that the treaty does not permit any reservation, the statement was repeated on May 13 whereby the countryreiterated willingness to ``adhere to some provisions of the CTBT after discussions''. If the position on CTBT betrayed ignorance, that on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty reflected political naivete.The government announced its decision to participate in the negotiations on FMCT. Barely ten months ago the then Prime minister had said India would not sign the FMCT, and that the CTBT and FMCT were two sides of the same coin. It is possible the government decided to change its position in the light of new realities, although nothing had happened that demanded such a change. To many in the government it was a gesture well received.The issue of gesture does not stop here. The issue of no-first-use may have been a matter of political conjecture; the voluntary moratorium on testing, which is a de facto acceptance of CTBT, was given away without any quid pro quo or a counter-gesture. However, it deserves to be mentioned that the government showed some pragmatism in rejecting the voluntary moratorium on fissilematerial production.The debate on nuclear policy in Parliament saw no less a person than the home minister himself linking the Kashmir issue to nuclear policy, even if indirectly. It hardly needs to be recalled that India has for years been talking in terms of delinking the two thereby fighting the Western agenda sold to Pakistan.Then came the Indo-US dialogue. Rounds after rounds of talks, and all in secret. The matter was sensitive, and the media could not be trusted. The Americans didn't think so. So we had Talbott himself giving brick-by-brick details of the agenda to the major dailies of both India and Pakistan. (Subsequently the Prime Minister obliged the nation by repeating it in Parliament.)These may be some reflections on the performance of the BJP-led coalition. But it can be said with certainty that the performance may not be different for any other government. Ignorance, unfortunately, on matters relating to nuclear-strategic issues cuts across party lines.The writer is a ResearchFellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
