It is shocking that two armed militants can walk into an army garrison in the Capital, fire at will and escape over a wall without a shot being fired at them. But that is what appeared to happen at the Red Fort on Friday night and it is likely to be attempted again. This should not occasion panic and alarm; it should lead to greater preparedness. Determined suicide attacks are notoriously hard to prevent as has been seen in India before as also in Sri Lanka, Israel, Northern Ireland and elsewhere. But the number of such attacks and their effectiveness can be minimised - and the cost to the attackers can be increased - if the security forces are vigilant and geared to expect the unexpected attack. Sadly, that was not the case in the Red Fort which is why the killers were apparently able to leave unharmed after their heinous acts. For a variety of reasons the attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba should have been anticipated and precautions taken. First, these are textbook disruptive tactics by extremist groups who have no interest in peace processes and have nothing to gain from them. There are innumerable examples of this from India's Northeast, West Asia and elsewhere in the world where an escalation of violence and attempts to widen the arena have followed in the wake of peace moves. Therefore, from the very start of New Delhi's Ramzan peace initiative it could have been predicted that hardliners like the Lashkar-e-Toiba who make no pretence of their hostility toward the initiative would go to any length to scuttle it. The motives are often complex, ranging from sheer cussedness to desperate attempts to emphasise their own relevance. The main factor is, those outside the process are going to in one way or another try and play a role in it. Second, although it is hard to pinpoint potential targets with precision, it is not impossible tocategorise high risk areas. In Kashmir over the last two years there have been certain common features in the attacks by militant groups. They have usually consisted of breathtakingly bold entries into and assaults on major military establishments by two or three militants armed with automatic weapons. The element of surprise is crucial. The more improbable the target - 6th corps headquarters in Srinagar, BSF barracks, the Red Fort - the more likely an attempt on it. Inevitably on the anniversary of the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 to Khandahar, the spotlight on security arrangements will be intense. Embarrassment and public criticism can lead the authorities to institute excessive counter-measures, unnecessary red alerts, reinforcements in places where they are not essential, a flurry of seemingly purposeful but pointless activity. More often than not, when the heat is off, there is a relapse into the old easygoing ways. Neither response is appropriate. Caution and steadiness will get the authorities where they need to be. Even as the security forces must expect more attacks and be ready to make a suitable response, the government must carry on steadily with its peace moves. The best answer to extremists is staying on course.
