DRASS/BATALIK, JULY 10: A major reason for the Pakistani rout in Drass and Batalik has been the failure of its officers to lead from the front, leaving charge with the junior commissioned officers (havildars and subedars) as they stayed in the comfort of fibre-glass huts.In the battle for Point 4700-Tommy-Saddle on the Drass Line of Control, the 18 Garhwal Rifles caught the enemy napping. ``Point 4700 has a steep cliff fall leading to a glacier where the enemy had pitched tents and two fibre-glass huts for the officers led by Major Azim Ahmad of the 6 Northern Light Infantry. With a few stoves, the temperature in the fibre-glass huts rises to near-room temperature,'' says a Major who took part in the assaults.During the day, the Pakistanis, using the `Jumar' mountaineering system, would slither down the cliff to their administrative base at the foot of Point 4700 comprising tents and the two fibre-glass huts. ``We noticed that they used to leave only one or two sentries on the top and returnto their positions in the evening. We advanced our normal attack timings to late afternoon and caught the intruders napping,'' said a havildar.Although eight Pakistani officers are believed to have died in Drass, most of them are believed to have been artillery officers guiding fire onto Indian positions. When the Indian Army launched a major offensive in the Drass sector, the Pakistani officers, including Maj Ahmad, fled across the Line of Control which is just a kilometre away from Point 4700.A radio intercept later from the besieged soldiers and JCOs clearly pointed to the sense of betrayal felt by the subordinate ranks. ``All the sahibs have fled, leaving us to brave the Hindustani attack. What can we do now,'' was the SOS sent from the Point 4700 sector to the master controller in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.But JCO-led operations are not new; in fact, they seem to be a tradition in the Pakistani Army. ``During the 1971 operations, the officers were sometimes found four to five km behind theirtroops, leaving charge with the JCOs,'' said a 1971 war veteran.While Indian officers do acknowledge the ``brilliant'' Pakistani plan of intrusion, they point to the isolation of the intruders once the Army started to cordon off the positions. ``For example, they had no clear command which could have helped them avoid the Indian Army's operations to outflank the intruders. The officers were not there in the front. And there was no way controllers in Pakistan could have guided the intruders and helped offset the our Army's moves,'' explained an officer involved in planning operations in Batalik.One of the main reasons for the Pakistani rout in Batalik was the outflanking of the intruders after the capture of the Khalubar ridge which exposed the main supply camp in the Munthodalo region. ``The Pakistanis did not realise the significance of holding onto Khalubar ridge at all costs. Once this ridge fell by the first week of July, the intruders just caved in because the supplylines were getting choked,'' said the officer. Top
