Pak goes shopping for an Israel policy

In July 2000, I wrote about growing India-Israel relations (Indo-Israel relations: What should Pakistan do? The Friday Times, July 7-13) and recommended that Pakistan should re-evaluate its Israel policy. Noting that India had begun to discuss the prospects of military cooperation with Israel and was procuring weapon systems from that country, I asked the question: What should Pakistan do?

This is what I wrote: ‘‘The issue presents a unique situation because one of the countries involved in the equation — Israel — is not recognised by Pakistan. Inevitably, the policy — or the lack of it — puts an inherent constraint on how much Pakistan can actually do to offset the prospect of India stealing a march on it by influencing Israel’s approach towards itself and, by extension, Pakistan. The policy also compels Pakistan to necessarily view Israel with suspicion and hostility. This essentially means that Pakistan cannot engage Israel to neutralise the Indian offensive against itself… There are two choices to be made. One is the continuation of the traditional policy. That, logically, does not allow Pakistan any room to manoeuvre because it simply cannot reach out to Israel and will just have to remain on its guard against any Indo-Israeli collusion against its interests. The other option is to re-evaluate the policy and see whether or not continuing the traditional policy holds an advantage for Pakistan.

Some facts need recounting. The days of the remittance economy are over, Pakistan is a nuclear power, PLO has recognised Israel and is in the process of negotiating a final deal with it (the many hiccups, notwithstanding). Other Arab countries, too, have come round to accepting Israel’s presence. Syria is prepared to continue talks with Israel, and Jordan of course has been instrumental in getting much of the groundwork done for the Madrid Conference and for later rounds of talks…

‘‘The issue for the policymakers is to decide, on the basis of cost-benefit analysis — whether continuing with the existing policy gives Pakistan a strategic advantage, for example, vis-a-vis the Arab world. It does not need be said that any such analysis must be objective. If it is found that there is more advantage in continuing with this policy then there is no need to reformulate it. Contrarily, if it is discovered that the policy is pegged to determinants that have long ceased to exist, it will be only logical to reevaluate the issue of relations with Israel. This is also essential in view of India’s attempt to reach out to Israel and the Arabs’ own reassessment of that country.’’

The best window for Pakistan to reach out to Israel was immediately after the Oslo Agreement. According to some reports the Pakistan army did a study in 1994 evaluating the possibility, especially in relation to India’s recognition of Israel and how that could likely impact Pakistan’s security. Apparently, the findings recommended that Pakistan should explore the possibility of reaching out to Israel. The study was also placed before the civilian, political government which got cold feet and decided to shelve the whole issue. The two main problems were how to sell the idea to the public and what might be the reaction of the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. It is somewhat surprising that no structured effort was made to judge or mould domestic opinion on a very important policy issue.

It is good to see that this time round the establishment has continued to send out feelers and made space for some discussion on the issue. In this regard the reactions of Pakistanis living in the Middle East are interesting. In a TV programme recently, most of them called up to say that it would be in Pakistan’s interest to recognise Israel. The situation on the ground has clearly changed. Last year, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia gave a proposal to Israel which contained the conditions under which Riyadh would recognise Israel. This proposal was also endorsed by the Arab League conference.

What is clear to everyone is a fundamental change in the Arab world: Israel cannot be dislodged and therefore some form of compromise is important. The issue does not relate any more to the illegitimacy of the Jewish state or the resolve to finish it off and reverse the great wrong of history but to get for the Palestinians an acceptable deal. The Palestinian Authority itself, first under Yasser Arafat and recently under Mahmoud Abbas has accepted Israel’s reality. Tel Aviv already has relations with Cairo, Ankara and Amman. There is absolutely no reason for Pakistan to avoid the issue in the absence of any direct conflict of interest with Israel. Basically, it needs to juxtapose the costs with the benefits in terms of its security requirements in South Asia, which clearly is the overriding factor.

India already is deeply entrenched in Israel. Recently, India’s national security advisor Brajesh Mishra — a key proponent of closer India-Israel relations — speaking in Washington DC talked about the natural US-Israel-India tri-combination in terms of convergence of interests and shared threats. If Pakistan were to recognise Israel now, it would be hard put to dislodge India. Yet, its diplomatic presence would compel Israel to rationalise its South Asia policy. India will not have a walkover on Pakistan.

(Courtesy: Daily Times)