On a wing and a plan

The aircraft likely to be in the race cover a wide spectrum of performance, and this would make choices not only difficult, but qualitatively different from past experience. The issue of ‘no single vendor’ could prove difficult. From a much lighter medium multi-role combat aircraft, the 12-tonne Swedish Gripen/Russian MiG-29/Amercian F-16, to European Eurofighter to heavier Russian MiG-35, to American F-18 with a fully loaded weight of 30 tonnes, technology, cost and performance (hence capability) would vary enormously. Weapons planned for each would make a difference; and compatibility with evolving force multipliers could add further complications for comparative evaluation. Considering that within the broader picture, the systems within the platform like the radar and avionics and the matching weapons could actually decide performance and costs, the complexities could only grow.

But it is vital that the next fighter deal must go well beyond simple purchase and even licence manufacture of major components. Even the licence manufacture option would leave the country dependent on external sources of supply. We were lulled in the past into the belief that transfer of technology was taking place while the reality was that it was production technology that was transferred and not the design technology and data. This is why we had to go back to Moscow to upgrade the comparatively less sophisticated aircraft like the MiG-21. We have the Su-30 being manufactured under licence, though we don’t know how much design data is being transferred. This is probably the reason for Russian discomfort over including an offsets clause from new purchases from them.

Large investments in defence modernisation with high-technology weapons like the acquisition of the new fighters must be leveraged to energise our defence (especially aerospace) industry. This should aim to serve two key purposes: build interdependence through horizontal and vertical partnerships, and empower Indian industry through capacity building with acquisition of modern aerospace technology. Both these principles are crucial to strengthening self-reliance through enhancing mutual dependence with countries and their industries that are willing to do so. These are also important for sustaining our broader techno-economic growth rates. Global trends in the aerospace industry on one side and India’s growing technological and economic capabilities on the other point towards mutual advantages in pursuing this route. This is where the issue of offsets assume great importance.

The offsets clause in our procurement policy may be seen by many of us as infusing FDI to the extent of 30-50 per cent of every contract into our economy. In spite of the large reserves of foreign exchange available, future FDI would continue to be an important factor. But this cannot be the primary reason for seeking offsets. We will need spare parts for thirty years or more. In between there will be many requirements of modifications and upgrades of the systems. We should be able to provide as much as possible from indigenous (mostly private) industry through joint ventures that must be negotiated now. The importance and extent of such agreements would be crucial to maintaining high serviceability and low accident rates of the combat force — and hence its effectiveness for war over the next three decades.

The new fighter would require a mid-life upgrade 10-15 years after it enters service, and this should provide a benchmark criterion for offsets to establish the ability to design and undertake that in India. This can be expected only if the components manufacturers establish design and development facilities in India. The Maruti experience of vendor development which has led to high levels of automotive parts exports needs a closer look in this regard. It needs to be remembered that design and development are the foundation for self-reliance, and till recently this suffered in our aircraft industry. The new fighter has already been designed elsewhere. But we have opportunities to access design and development of components, systems and sub-systems in partnership with foreign enterprises.

Ultimately all this must fit into the principle of broader national interests and geopolitical strategy to sustain them beyond system costs and performance factors. The question of American reliability will worry a lot of minds for a long time. European policies in the past have raised doubts about the impact of US policies on even product support; and now EU partners’ differences may also impact their future actions. The Soviet Union (and the relationship it had with us) disappeared long ago, and new dimensions are already impacting Indo-Russian arms relationship, not the least of them being the Russian high-end military technology flows to China, and the China-Pakistan strategic nexus where China is one of the two suppliers of high-technology arms for Pakistan’s air force. The signals Moscow is sending out are not very helpful. In the ultimate interest, the decision about the new combat aircraft should rest on broader national interests.

The writer, a retired air commodore, is director of an independent professional think-tank, the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi