Official, for the first time: Rao backed off nuclear tests after Clinton called

The fact that Clinton called Rao—after mid-December reports in the US press on test preparations—finds mention in India’s Nuclear Bomb written by George Perkovich (1999). But this is the first time that a top-ranking US official has confirmed the speculation. Perkovich, incidentally, quoted a ‘‘knowledgeable American official’’ on the Clinton-Rao conversation.

Talbott’s revelation came earlier this week to Shekhar Gupta, Editor-in-Chief of The Indian Express, on NDTV 24 X 7’s Walk the Talk.

‘‘The US government took the information we had, brought it to the Prime Minister through his personal secretary of the time and said that this is what we think you are going to do. It is going to be a huge mistake,’’ Talbott said.

Asked by Gupta whether Clinton called Rao, Talbott said ‘‘Yes. There was no formal promise (that India would not test), America’s message was received and the test didn’t happen.’’ He went on to add, ‘‘It wasn’t a threat but there was a strong argument because it would be contrary to everybody’s interest.’’

Speaking to The Indian Express today, Talbott said: ‘‘We can only speculate why Prime Minister Rao made the decision to defer the test, but I do think the American representations had something to do with them.’’

He also pointed out that the Indian establishment learnt a lesson from the December 1995 episode. ‘‘They decided there and then that they would never get caught out again, that next time they set up the tests it was going to be with much higher levels of secrecy.’’

Under the circumstances, Talbott conceded, the fact that Pokharan II by the BJP government wasn’t detected was an ‘‘abysmal failure’’ of US intelligence. And that he learnt about the tests ‘‘from CNN.’’

‘‘It was a very bad Monday morning for me,’’ Talbott said. ‘‘I came into the office expecting to work on other things. The State Department found out from CNN that the tests had occurred, so I called my counterpart in the intelligence agency. He hadn’t heard about it either. So he faced the double embarrassment of learning from the State Department which had heard from CNN.

The first thing that the US did after India went nuclear, Talbott said, was not only to institute an inquiry and impose sanctions as inevitable under US law, but also sought to persuade the Pakistanis not to test. Within two days of India going nuclear, Clinton was sending Talbott to Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad, to persuade him from not playing ‘‘copycat, as is their wont.’’

Of course, he didn’t succeed, Talbott said, despite the fact that he met all the senior people within the Pak establishment. Much ‘‘positive reinforcement’’ was offered, including telling them that India would be let off the hook by the US if Islamabad tested, but the Pakistani government did not listen.