There are some striking similarities between the officers of the Armoured Corps and their counterparts in the fighter pilots stream of the Air Force. For starters, both are convinced that the war would be lost but for them. But then both have also played a scanty role in India's national contingencies since the 1971 war. Save for a momentary glimpse of glory that Exercise Brasstacks gave them, these two officer classes have made a negligible contribution to the operations launched since 1984.The more disturbing aspects of this similarity exercise, however, is that both the fighting streams have consumed the maximum portions of the defence budgets through an indiscriminate and largely unaccountable import-dominated fixation. It is a depressing thought, but the Armoured Corps and the fighter pilots of the Air Force have got away with throwing rational budgeting out of the window, by simply giving scintillating demonstrations of flying and driving. Both types, hold your breath, have no stake inmaking India's defence budgets more security friendly, but simply user friendly. This peculiarity has been demonstrated earlier and is being exhibited again.Take the Armoured Corps first. In the 1960s, India imported the Chieftain tanks from Britain, and developed a local variant called Vijayanta, claiming it to be the solution to all national worries. Notwith-standing its excellent gunnery, the Vijayanta suffered due to indifferent engine performance. In the meantime the T-55s were also imported from the Soviet Union. Rugged and reliable, but not much of gunnery in it. So instead of developing the Vijayanta with a new engine-transmission package, a new state-of-the-art Main Battle Tank (MBT) became a recurring demand. The first study teams for an indigenous MBT were already doing their work, but the Armoured Corps would have nothing to do with it. They wanted a ready made platform, off the shelf. How the T-72 ever came to fit the bill will remain one of those perpetually recurring Indian mysteries.Designed for the European plains, around the shorter Central Asian tank crews and combat duration of only three days, the T-72 suddenly became the stuff of Armoured Corps dreams.Indian armour will never fight in that kind of terrain. Where it can make the ideal cavalry charge is the deserts but the T-72 main barrel cannot depress to the degree required whilst traversing sand dunes. After all the barrel has been designed for the European plains, where elevation is of greater importance. And then the armoured regiments recruit largely from the northern classes, whose minimum height is more than what the T-72 was designed around. No thoughts for crew fatigue?In all these years of T-72 import and production, India has also had an indigenous MBT programme, the Arjun. But the Armoured Corps would have none of it; rubbishing the project from its inception, and contributing virtually nothing to ensure its success. Statistical arguments aside, the Arjun is the future of Indian armour, as well as the best provenplatform for its self-propelled howitzers. But most of the Armoured Corps would still not accept it, preferring instead to go in for yet another import, the T-90, and then only two regiments!One thought the efficacy of armour was determined by the mass deployed. And this in the same year that the Army cannot buy enough new rifles for operational areas for want of funds! One would have thought it was Armoured Corps fighting the militants in the Kashmir Valley.This inexplicable saga is replicated by the fighter pilots' penchant for prepackaged imports. Nothing illustrates that better than the bizarre HF-24 Marut tale. An Indian project, helped by the legendary Kurt Tank, the Marut flew, but with a poor engine. Despite its excellent aerodynamics, the engine caused a spate of accidents. So instead of developing the engine, and ensuring the success of the programme, the Air Force simply closed the project. Obviously India was a country of limitless resources for all those crores to have been simply writtenoff. Every other country would have persevered and ensured that the aircraft flew, and became better. By now a Marut variant could have been flying as the advanced jet trainer. But the fighter pilots are made of different stuff, so India will import one.Had India continued with the Marut programme, it would not have been facing the difficulty that it currently faces in making the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) fly. Expertise cannot be created, it is gained, over time and with effort. The LCA project is now 15 years old, still not a bad achievement considering that aircraft-manufacturing countries take the same time, if not more. All this while India has been importing more and more different types of aircraft, like its tanks, and now the stables can be said to have various pedigrees. The latest crowd thriller being the most bizarre purchase. An Air Force of this vintage, and size, with not one force multiplier in its ranks is an incomplete service. But instead of filling those gaps, the Air Force convincedthe government that Rs 6000 crore plus could be spent on one purchase, and that too numbering only 40 aircraft.As good as it may be, the Su-30 cannot replicate the accuracy, consistency and cost-effectiveness of ballistic missiles. What vital defence need could 40 aircraft fill when the service itself has serious material and systemic deficiencies? Or two T-90 regiments which will cost many times more money than has yet been spent on MBT Arjun? The tank men and fighter pilots must be superior humans, for a layman cannot seem to understand their minds.
