Of Faith and Fission

FOR more than five decades after India formally set up its atomic energy programme, the real story of the country’s nuclear estate had ...

FOR more than five decades after India formally set up its atomic energy programme, the real story of the country’s nuclear estate had remained shrouded in mystery and ambiguity. Other than Years of Pilgrimage (1991), the autobiography of Raja Ramanna, the scientist often described as the father of India’s nuclear bomb, much of what was written about the country’s nuclear programme was mere speculation, often unreasoned and ill informed.

From Fission to Fusion:
the Story of India’s Atomic Energy Programme
By M R Srinivasan
Viking
Price: Rs 495

Much of this changed in 1998. Not only did the nuclear tests in May that year create a new clarity in India’s nuclear policy, but they also represented an intellectual watershed. A greater confidence and a willingness to share information led to a proliferation of insightful writings on India’s engagement with the nuclear genie. Four books, published within the last four years, have pretty much said all there was to be said about India and nuclear weapons. These are: George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (1999); Raj Chengappa’s Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (2000); Ashley Tellis’ India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001); and Bharat Karnard’s Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security(2002).

There is, however, a part of India’s nuclear programme that has received far less intellectual attention. India’s quest to develop a nuclear power programme to help secure its energy needs was, and arguably still is, the mainstay of India’s nuclear infrastructure. Indeed, only the most ill-informed would argue that the civil part of the programme provided merely a cover for the military portion. The reality is that both Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha genuinely believed in the potential of nuclear energy, and had consistently argued that harnessing it could greatly contribute to making India self reliant. And yet, for a variety of reasons India’s civil nuclear power programme has not lived up to either its own targets or the expectations that many had of it.

It is principally the story of India’s nuclear power programme that M R Srinivasan relates with insight, clarity and elegance. And there are few better people than Srinivasan to write an informed account. A nuclear engineer, who earned a doctorate from McGill, Srinivasan was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (his term ended in 1990).

Srinivasan traces the history from Homi Bhabha’s letter to Sorab Saklathvala of the Dorabji Tata Trust in 1944, in which he suggested the importance of setting up an institute to study to the more recent developments in the programme. Many may be disappointed by the lack of gossip in Srinivasan’s account. And yet, he does not gloss over the more controversial episodes in the history of India’s nuclear programme. The cold war between Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna, over the credit for Pokhran I, is written in explicit detail. The tensions between Srinivasan and Ramanna too are not glossed over.

Srinivasan also recounts the deeply embarrassing moment when in 1994, A Gopalkrishnan, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, published reports revealing that safety standards were not being met in a number of the facilities of the nuclear programme. In sum, Srinivasan’s account, while too clinical in many parts, will generate enough ammunition to keep the sparks flying for quite some time.