A good 10 days before the expiry of the US-established deadline for Iran to come clean on its nuclear programme, Tehran agreed to allow tougher UN inspections of its nuclear facilities, provide full cooperation to the inspectors, sign the additional protocol of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that allows special inspections and suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing programmes.The UK, France and Germany, which helped achieve this agreement, hailed it as an important breakthrough. The US is still not convinced.It accuses Iran of mouthing platitudes and not really abandoning its WMD path. It now seems that despite Iran agreeing to all major IAEA conditions, the controversy will not be over soon, since even these are no longer considered sufficient to stop an emerging nuclear Iran from renouncing the NPT.This article is no brief for nuclear proliferation. Neither does it seek to plead Iran’s case. Instead it attempts to bring into focus certain absurdities dotting the nuclear debate.The first of these stalks the nuclear proliferation regime as it hinges upon the NPT.Iran ratified the treaty in 1970. As a non-nuclear weapons state (non-NWS) under the treaty, it is supposed to have consciously abjured the right to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Of course, it does have the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme as long as this is subject to IAEA inspections.However, as is evident, even the IAEA safeguards regime and NPT commitments are no guarantees against nuclear proliferation. Rather, the threat of this proliferation today is more from countries that are already members of the treaty.Why? Take Iran itself as a test case. The country is placed in an uneasy and unstable neighbourhood. Though Saddam Hussein is gone, the instability in Iraq has not. The US is almost at its doorstep, with it the Israeli threat.Given US propensity for controlling the oil economy, Iran is well aware of what American control of the region would mean. Having witnessed the fate of Iraq, the danger of unilateralism is not lost on Tehran.At the same time, it has also seen the soft handling of North Korea since it is believed to be in possession of nuclear weapons. No arm-twisting has been possible there. Above all, Iran has seen nuclear weapons acquiring greater salience in security strategies of the NWS.In the light of all these, should Iran be blamed for possibly wanting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability? And can these factors not motivate other countries?Second, the manner in which the Iranian case is handled is going to observed carefully. Will Iran unconditionally cancel its programme of acquiring fuel cycle capability?But why should it? It can well argue that having such facilities, if they are fully IAEA-inspected, is legal under the NPT.Iran has announced its intention to install 7,000 megawatts of nuclear electrical generating capacity over the next 20 years. This would require substantial capital and technology imports currently denied to many developing countries because of stringent nuclear export controls.From the Iranian perspective, it would be prudent to demand additional power reactors, or at least a US commitment not to block Iran’s acquisition of nuclear power reactors from Russia or elsewhere, assurances of nuclear fuel supply for its Bushehr reactor, lifting of economic sanctions and high-tech assistance. If granted however, what message would such concessions carry for other nuclear hopefuls?The other way of handling Iran would be through coercive, unilateral options. This could be counterproductive. Military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites are unlikely to succeed, given the dispersed and advanced nature of its nuclear programme.Such threats would only serve to accelerate and expand Iran’s efforts to obtain a nuclear arsenal, which in turn could provoke its neighbours to seek similar capability and improve existing conventional arsenals.The outcome of such build-ups would not enhance regional or international security. Meanwhile, the repeated use of unilateralist military strikes, particularly against targets of one religious dispensation, would set into motion its own dynamics.Evidently there is no easy solution. However, the safest would be two-pronged.At one level, it would be necessary to understand and deal with the motivations of non-nuclear countries desirous of seeking nuclear weapons. At another level, it would be prudent for nuclear haves to reduce the importance of these WMD in their security strategies.None of this is easy. But for the sake of longterm international security, it might be worthwhile to get away from the politics of short-term fixes.
