When Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee rose above party politics in Parliament today to endorse the NDA government’s handling of the situation in Kargil and said that the time taken before air power was deployed wasn’t the reason for higher casualties, he had sufficient reason.
Official Army records and The Indian Express war reports, recalling the May 1999 sequence of events from the time the first Pakistani intrusion was detected by the Army in the Batalik sector to the May 25 Cabinet Committee on Security decision to call in the IAF, show how the Government carefully weighed the pros and cons before ordering the air strikes.
In fact, Mukherjee stood by the Vajpayee government for avoiding till the very end any move that could have escalated the conflict with its nuclear neighbour. And said that of the 474 Kargil casualties, there were only 35 in the days preceding the air strikes.
Consider the chain of events which establish that air reconnaisance began as early as May 12, three days after the Army first reported the intrusion as serious:
The first spotting
• May 3: A routine patrol of 3 Punjab detects the presence of 3-4 men in black outfits in Yaldor, Batalik sector
• May 5: DGMO N C Vij visits Kargil Brigade. Two patrols are sent out in Batalik area but go out of communication reach
• May 6: Fresh patrol reports presence of 9-10 men in black outfits, three snow tents, radio antenna and igloos. Warning issued, commandos of 10 Garhwal and 16 Grenadiers move in. Artillery placed on alert
• May 7: Significant enemy presence sighted in Batalik sector. 16 Grenadiers engage enemy, four soldiers killed, another four wounded
First Army request for helicopter gunships
• May 8: Northern Command tells Army Hqs it needs helicopter gunships. Pak artillery opens up, intruders assessed to be around 300
• May 9: For first time, Army assesses intrusion as serious, suspects Pak regulars though IB maintains it’s Taliban. Gen V P Malik leaves for Poland
• May 10: 10 Garhwal patrol fired at, soldier killed, nine injured. Five go missing. More Army units inducted
• May 11: Op Vijay launched with 70 Infantry Brigade Commander in-charge in Batalik sector. More troops inducted to strengthen Drass, Kaksar sectors. 15 Corps Commander Lt Gen Krishan Pal identifes 8 intrusions in Batalik
Air recces begin
• May 12: Enemy sighted in Drass sector on Tololing. Deputy Commander of 70 Inf Bde and CO 16 Grenadiers do a helicopter recce, confirm intrusion. IAF helicopter fired at, lands with damaged rotor. Northern Command places J&K theatre under high alert. Sikh, Jat, Naga battalions move in
• May 13: IAF gears for action, aware its induction could mean escalating conflict
• May 15: George Fernandes briefed, says intruders will be ousted in 48 hours. Helicopter recce confirm large scale intrusion in Mushkoh, Tiger Hill, Batalik, Kaksar. IAF chopper fired at in Kaksar, rotor damaged. Special Forces inducted
• May 16: Mushkoh situation critical, enemy sighted in large numbers. GOC III Div Maj Gen V S Budhwar arrives in Kargil to take charge
CCS meets
• May 17: Fernandes, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh briefed in presence of three chiefs. Intrusion sighted north of Batalik sector at Chorbat La. Heavy artillery shelling.
• May 18: CCS meets. While Army wants IAF to attack enemy supply lines across LoC, IAF points out escalation possibility
• May 19: Special Forces take a hit in Batalik. 8 Sikh tries to capture Tiger Hill, casualties under heavy fire. Drass sector turned over to 56 Mountain Brigade
• May 20: RAW, police provide inputs on enemy incursion. For the first time, fear of Pakistanis infiltrating into civilian areas. Gen Malik returns from Poland
• May 21: An IAF Canberra on a photo-recce comes under missile fire, returns to base with damaged wing
• May 21: Repeated attempts by troops fail to dislodge enemy
• May 22: Army changes tactics: Ops to be planned, no frontal attacks
• May 23: Gen Malik and Northern Army Commander Lt Gen H M Khanna arrive in Kargil. Want situation stabilised by May 27
• May 24: Vajpayee, Jaswant and Fernandes briefed by Gen Malik. Decision to use attack helicopter on Tololing taken as Army seeks political clearance for IAF use
• May 25: CCS decides to apply air power within LoC
• May 26: IAF fighters attack enemy positions in Tololing, Tiger Hill
• May 27: Air strikes move to Batalik, Mushkoh. MiG-27 downed next day.