The need for long-term defence planning was harshly brought home to us after the 1962 debacle when the American nudged us and we started the Five-year Defence Plans for future modernisation. But a conclusion is inescapable that defence planning and modernisation continue to suffer in spite of valiant efforts. In fact we seem to have lost sight of the basic principle of budgeting: that is, expenditure control and management, not in the sense of grandma’s adage of saving by not spending, but to spend according to a plan. Normally unforeseen circumstances would push actual expenditures above the budgeted amount although we can claim that in the early 1990s, when resources were really scarce, we were able to balance our books pretty well, except that a backlog of modernisation had started to build up. In a season of elections such issues of undoubted national interest tend to get left out in the public discourse unfortunately. When we start returning large sums as unspent at an average annual rate of almost Rs 7,000 crore — year after year — out of the budgeted amounts, it is obvious that defence planning has been going wrong somewhere. One indicator is that the Five-year Defence Plan, which was to commence in 2002, has still not been finalised in spite of the Group of Ministers’ (GoMs’) direction that this should be done before the commencement of the plan period. This, of course, is not the first time it has happened and that’s why the GoM stressed the need for change. The gaps in planning shows in the Defence Services asking for Rs 89,000 crore for 2003-04, the finance ministry allocating Rs 65,300 crore in the Budget, and the revised estimates showing Rs 60,300 crore spent. Poor defence planning and modernisation are among the major factors for inter-service rivalries which have debilitating long term effects. What is worse is that the hardest hit sector is that of modernisation, essentially because most of the non-capital expenditure continues to be pre-committed in pay, allowances and running the vast defence establishment. To cap it, under the capital expenditure head which covers almost 80 per cent of modernisation, we have surrendered on an average between 20-30 per cent (in some cases as much as 49 per cent!) of the annual budgeted amounts during the past five years. Even the modernisation under the revenue head has been suffering in spite of funds allocated for them. Obviously, we have to reform our decision making as well as our way of looking at things. It is well-recognised that the 1962 debacle had its roots in inadequate defence preparedness; and one of the motivations for Pakistan to launch the Kargil war four years ago was the perception that our defence forces were not in good shape. There are other implications, too. The low level of conventional capability increases the country’s reliance on nuclear weapons, something that we must avoid. For example, a number of influential strategic experts are now arguing that we must be ready to exercise the nuclear option first. But the only rational scenario under which we would need to rely on the first use of the nuclear arsenal would be if we have lost a substantive portion of our military power, and/or valuable territory that cannot be regained by our conventional forces. And that could happen only if the conventional capability keeps going down rather than up to create a firebreak against nuclear weapons. One swallow does not a summer make, similarly, a few high-profile weapon systems do not make the full picture. Defence modernisation is a process; and countries may disrupt that process only at the risk of their future security. We need to seriously reflect on why we have not come to terms with the imperatives of such a process. Is it a problem of institutions or that of our culture? We have set up a number of institutions like Integrated Defence Staff, Defence Intelligence Agency, and Procurement Board, etc, in recent years to improve defence planning. In a way all of them are recycling those set up at the time of independence but which somehow did not or were not allowed to work. Our institutional memory and attention to history is so weak that many senior members of the task forces designing new institutions for defence management were not aware of this elementary truth. Surprisingly, it is the political leaders and non-defence segment of the country which has been pressing the government of the day for defence modernisation. For example, based on a number of expert studies, the 11th Finance Commission (1999), the statutory body charged with allocation of national financial resources between the states and central government, had stipulated that defence expenditure should go up from the then 2.5 per cent of the GDP to 3.0 per cent by 2004. In reality this would come down to 2.1 per cent in the coming financial year if we spend the full amount budgeted. No wonder our combat force level in the Indian Air Force (which is worse hit by the 15-year long lack of modernisation) has been going down rather than increasing to meet the likely challenges of the coming decade. Replacement of aircraft lost in accidents alone in the past decade required induction of nearly 300 combat aircraft against which only 40 Su-30 besides a dozen others have come in. Meanwhile the air force manages with shortages and old aircraft. In contrast, China (which has already produced a new fighter jointly with Pakistan) is now well into the third decade of its massive military modernisation where it continues to receive modern technology from our good friends, the Russians, Israelis and West Europeans. The Parliament’s Estimates Committee had expressed dismay 15 years ago that we do not have a defence policy and strongly argued for reduction of colour service in the army, besides filling up shortages in the officer cadre. Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in doing either in spite of numerous studies, including by the Fifth Central Pay Commission. Similarly, the bipartisan Standing Committee on Defence of the Parliament has gone through its five-year term pressing for the utilisation of space capabilities for our defence and hence the establishment of an Aerospace Command as part of the Indian Air Force modernisation without success. Maybe someone someday would file a PIL and things may then start moving on the instructions from the judiciary!
