The process of government formation, with all the usual focus on politics and resolving the pulls and pressures of emerging political equations should not push a vital issue out of consideration of both the outgoing as well as incoming Prime Minister. We need to highlight the fact that this would be the first time an Indian government would be changing, including the transfer of power from one party to the other, after the country formally acquired nuclear weapons, and maintains credible nuclear forces for deterrence, consequently has a duly designated National Command Authority. This reality requires careful and urgent attention.
The Prime Minister of India as the elected executive head of the government would naturally be the ultimate authority for the control and use of nuclear weapons if such a contingency were to arise. At this point it is, of course, hypothetical to visualise such a contingency. But that should not lead to any complacency or misunderstanding. In fact the occasion should be seen as an opportunity to test our procedures for transfer of authority related to nuclear forces, their readiness and potential for employment.
As per the brief announcement of January last year, the National Command Authority would have an Executive Committee headed by the National Security Advise—Brajesh Mishra in this case, who is also the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee. He is obviously the crucial link in the chain of nuclear command.
The new government led by the Congress and the new Prime Minister would have to decide the appointment of a National Security Adviser who may or may not be the Principal Secretary to the PM. The Congress manifesto promises to ‘‘make the National Security Council a professional and effective institution’’. As a nuclear weapon state, the transfer of authority in the nuclear chain of command is a critical step in this process. The country and the world would be watching very carefully for signs how the leadership handles the transfer of nuclear command chain responsibilities, especially since the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command is also scheduled to retire at the end of this month.
The obvious policy option for the national leadership is to nominate the person(s) in the chain at the earliest with the appointment of a National Security Adviser, or another person to take on his responsibilities with regard to the nuclear arsenal, coinciding with the swearing in of the new Prime Minister. This would be a totally new experience for our political elite who are likely to be far busier with portfolios and politics. But it is vital both in terms of safeguarding the supreme national security interest as well in establishing the precedent for procedures in the critical area of national defence.
If the incoming Prime Minister needs some time to nominate the replacement for the National Security Adviser, then logically, the current incumbent should be asked to carry on till the transfer can be assured in a seamless manner.