More than one China

That it has taken 65 years for a leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party, better known as KMT, to follow the footsteps of Chiang Kaishek, says a lot about India8217;s unimaginative China policy. New Delhi8217;s decision to serenade Ma Yingjeou, the KMT8217;s presidential candidate in the impending general elections in Taiwan, suggests the dawn of a new pragmatism. India8217;s 8216;One China8217; policy had become a mantra as New Delhi bristled with greater hostility towards Taiwan than even Beijing did. Despite initiating 8220;unofficial8221; ties with Taiwan in 1992, New Delhi has refused to build on the many opportunities for a deeper relationship. No one in Taiwan expects India to extend diplomatic recognition. While all major powers have pursued expansive engagement with Taiwan, within the rubric of a 8216;one China8217; policy, New Delhi was paralysed by what Beijing might think or say.

The gap between India8217;s persistent illusions about China and an enduring divergence of interests was brought into sharp focus when the KMT leader Chiang Kaishek came to India in early 1942. As Japan began to overrun Southeast Asia, London encouraged Chiang to persuade the Indian nationalists to focus on the 8220;anti-fascist8221; struggle and ease off the pressure against Britain. Chiang8217;s attempts to bridge the different priorities of the Chinese and Indian national movements had little chance of success, with the Congress getting ready to launch the Quit India movement. Since then, a reluctance to confront the real differences with Beijing, and a belief that sentimentalism could substitute sensible strategy, have become the hallmarks of India8217;s China policy.

Ma8217;s visit should herald more than an improvement of bilateral ties with Taiwan, which is a democracy, one of the world8217;s largest trading entities and offers many commercial complementarities. It should also open the door for a sophisticated Indian policy towards 8220;Greater China8221;. Put together, the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan are on the verge of becoming India8217;s largest trading partner. The powerful Chinese networks all over Southeast Asia could easily invest billions of dollars in India. As they globalise, China8217;s border regions like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Yunnan are crying out for economic integration with the subcontinent. Much like China, which has leveraged the conflict in the post-partition subcontinent for strategic gains, New Delhi too can take advantage of the many political faultlines in Greater China, without violating the basic framework of state-to-state relations with Beijing. Differentiation, then, holds the key to a successful China policy.