On the wall facing the entrance to the UN Headquarters in New York the words of the Old Testament prophet Isaiah are prominently written: “They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nations shall not lift up sword against nation neither shall they learn war.”
This vision dates from a time when war was considered to be a kind of natural phenomenon. The prophet spoke of the national gods, which were the projection of national pride, national security and aggressiveness.
National gods eventually became war gods. But the prophet had not anticipated the time when human beings would acquire the capacity to destroy the world itself.
Then there were new prophets. Churchill warned: "The Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science and what might now shower immeasurable blessings upon mankind may even bring about its total destruction."
The `gleaming wings of science’ would never take us to national security, a classic study by two American scientists in 1964concluded. Jerome Weisner and Herbert York, who played a major role in the shaping of US nuclear policy, came to the conclusion that there is no technical solution for national security. "Both sides in an arms race are confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security." Thus they found themselves driven back to the very factors they initially excluded in the study political, social, economic and psychological questions, and above all, moral issues and human values.
Is it not surprising that in India, there is little discussion on the profound ethical and moral issues raised by the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons? This is a time for fundamental, prophetic, ethical indignation from all those who value life.
The first crucial ethical difference between nuclear and conventional weapons derives from the scale of nuclear devastation, a scale out of proportion to any reasonable objective of war. Warfare on such a scale involves a degree ofunpredictability humanity cannot afford to risk.
The second crucial difference derives from the indiscriminate character of such weapons, whose destructiveness cannot even in theory be confined to combatants. Indeed, not only would non-combatants suffer major casualties but much of the biosphere might be devastated as well. The long-term effects of radiation add a further indiscriminate element.
That is why the theory of nuclear deterrence is immoral. The ugly paradox of deterrence is that the capabilities of deterrent forces must be real and the willingness to use them sufficiently credible in order to deter. For deterrence to be effective the intention to use has not only to be repeatedly stated but also backed up by training, targeting, maintenance and constant development. Deterrence is willingness and readiness to use nuclear weapons.
The ethics of deterrence are the ethics of threatening to do something which we believe would be immoral, which one intends to do only in circumstances that will notarise because of this conditional threat. Such conditional intention implies that one has consented in one’s mind to act immorally.
It is argued that India has no intention of using its weapons unless an opponent attacks it knowing that India will use its nuclear weapons. The argument is that the opponent would have to accept full moral responsibility for India’s response. But if Indian nuclear weapons are ever used it will be because of decisions India will have taken. The moral dilemma cannot be avoided in the manner suggested. India is now making the choices that could eventually result in the use of nuclear weapons. The choices are immoral.
“Deterrence is a disaster because deterrence is not a stationary but a degenerating state,” E.P. Thompson has stated. It also indicates the degeneration of the state.