Moonglow over Asia

When the news editor for The Times, London, rang me up on the night of July 12, 1971, to check whether Henry Kissinger, the then US secret...

When the news editor for The Times, London, rang me up on the night of July 12, 1971, to check whether Henry Kissinger, the then US secretary of state, had gone to China, I was a stringer for that newspaper. I had reported on his talks in New Delhi five days earlier but I hadn8217;t the faintest idea of his visit to China.

I checked with our Foreign Office, which dismissed it outright. I informed the news editor in London that there was no confirmation available. Subsequently, I came to know that Farrukh Humayun Beg, the Islamabad stringer of The Daily Telegraph, London, had filed a story on Kissinger8217;s departure to China by a Pakistan Air Force plane on July 9. But the story was killed at Islamabad itself. The reason to go back to that entire episode is simply this: It can now be pieced together on the basis of the file maintained by then Pakistan President Yahya Khan, who had acted as an intermediary on that occasion. The file has been made public.

That Kissinger feigned illness in Pakistan and went to Beijing for two days, July 9 and 10, to arrange a meeting between President Nixon and theChinese leaders, is known. What is not known is how Yahya Khan helped arrange the meeting between the two enemy countries through handwritten letters. Both America and China were so beholden to Pakistan that they promised action if Indian forces ever went to East Pakistan to assist the Bangladeshis in their liberation struggle. There are some nasty remarks against Nehru and Indira Gandhi and the Memorandum of Conversation, kept in the National Security Archives, Washington, reveals this.

A detailed account of this development is now available in a book, From a Head, Through a Head, To a Head, by F.S. Aijazuddin, a chartered accountant. The secret channel between the US and China through Pakistan was coded as Moonglow8217; and the correspondence back and forth was spread over two years, from 1969 to 1971. Messages from the White House were either dictated or typed on unmarked plain paper and handed personally to Agha Hilaly, the then Pakistan ambassador in Washington. He would then type the oral message or transcribe it in his own hand. The message would be sent by diplomatic bag to Yahya Khan and the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad communicated Beijing8217;s reply to Yahya Khan personally. This procedure was adopted because both the US and the Chinese insisted on absolute secrecy.

There is no doubt that Chou-En Lai, the then Chinese premier, promised Islamabad that Beijing would intervene in case there was a war between India and Pakistan over the creation of Bangladesh. But he did not keep his word. Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, who was heading the military operation in East Pakistan at that time told India, when he was a POW, that Islamabad had assured him of China8217;s assistance but it did not come.

When Chou-En Lai met Nixon, he blamed Yahya Khan for not leading his troops in East Pakistan. He is reported to have said, quot;Even though we assisted with armaments, we didn8217;t send a single military personnel8230;We only sent some people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent, and afterwards brought those people back.quot;

Nixon said: quot;We have a problem with regard to military assistance, because of our Congress, and as I informed the Prime Minister and as the Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guan Hua knows, American public opinion opposes military assistance to Pakistan. Incidentally, in retrospect, it is my belief that had we been able to provide more assistance to Pakistan,it would have averted war, because India would not have been tempted to win what they thought was a cheap victory. But that is water over the dam.quot; Kissinger had conveyed a strong warning against starting war when he met Indira Gandhi at New Delhi on July 7.

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China would stand by Pakistan in the present crisis. This position began to develop with a rather low-key remark at a dinner on the first night thatChina quot;could not but take some interest in the situationquot;. The dinner between Chou-En Lai and Nixon ended with a request to the US president to convey assurance of Chinese support to Yahya Khan.

Nixon has been recorded as saying: quot;I told Chou that we were trying very hard to discourage an Indo-Pak war. I assured him that we were bringing allthe influence we could to try to prevent a war from developing. Chou said this was a good thing, but he inferred that we might not be able to do too much because we were 10,000 miles away. China, however, was much closer. Chou recalled the Chinese defeat of India in 1962 and hinted rather broadly that the same thing could happen again.quot; The Chinese detestation of theIndians came through loud and clear.

According to the Memorandum of Conversation recorded on February 23, 1972, Nixon said: quot;Nehru would certainly rank among the most intelligent. He could also be arrogant, abrasive and suffocatingly self-righteous, and he hada distinct superiority complex that he took few pains to conceal.quot; He had also met Mrs Gandhi in 1953 when she was her father8217;s hostess and found her charming and graceful8217;. quot;When I encountered her years later, however, when she was Prime Minister and I was President, there was no doubt that she was her father8217;s daughter. Her hostility toward Pakistan was, if anything, even stronger than him.quot;

Nixon shared the perception of quot;Mrs Gandhi8217;s genetic inheritancequot; with Chou-En Lai who, in their meeting in 1972 and expressed the thought that it was a quot;great pityquot; that she had taken quot;as her legacy the philosophy of her father embodied in the book, Discovery of India.quot; He asked Nixon whether he had read it. Kissinger, sensing that his President had not, intervened by saying: quot;He was thinking of a great Indian Empire.quot; Chou-En Lai replied: quot;Yes, he was thinking of a great Indian Empire 8212; Malaysia, Ceylon, etc. It would probably also include our Tibet. When he was writing that book he was in a British prison, but one reserved for gentlemen in Darjeeling. Nehru told me himself that the prison was in Sikkim, facing the Himalayan mountains. At the time I hadn8217;t read the book, but my colleague Chen Yi had, and called it to my attention. He said it was precisely the spirit of India which was embodied in the book. Later on when I read it, I had the same thought.quot;

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What the conversation between the Chinese premier and Nixon underlined is the disdain8217; for India felt by both sides. Both promised Islamabad that they would intervene but did not. Even on December 14, 1971, a day before Niazi8217;s surrender, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan8217;s foreign minister,called Yahya Khan to hold on since America was about to intervene. Nixon first sent a warning8217; signal to India and then ordered the Seventh Fleet, led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, to go to the Bay of Bengal. China did not even go over the exercise to help Islamabad. It turns out that both were interested in saving8217; West Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi had no intention of taking the war there.

The secret channel between the US and China through Pakistan was coded as Moonglow8217; and the correspondence back and forth was spread over two years 8211;1969 to 1971