Lost tango in Washington

The Bush administration turned this approach on its head. Viewing India as part of the solution to proliferation, the president embarked on a course of action that would permit India greater — not lesser — access to controlled technologies despite the fact that New Delhi would not surrender its nuclear weapons programme and would continue to formally remain outside the global non-proliferation regime. The most important thing the US would ask for in return was that India institutionalise world-class export controls. This is the true revolutionary import of the NSSP: a change in the US strategic orientation towards India that in time will be far more consequential than any of the minutiae encoded in the current agreement. In effect, the NSSP implies the administration would seek to build a transforming partnership with India that includes satisfying its longstanding desire for greater access to restricted commodities so long as it does not utilise these artifacts to advance its own strategic programmes or for unlawful export.

Some might argue that if the Bush administration wanted to be truly revolutionary, it would not only increase New Delhi’s access to controlled technologies but also would permit their utilisation in India’s strategic weapon programmes. While this policy may be desirable in the long run, no US administration today can permit such an arrangement without completely undermining the global non-proliferation regime at a time when it is more fragile than ever before. It is to Bush’s credit that he has actually reached out to India in such unsettled times. True, the administration is not yet prepared to support India in enlarging its strategic capabilities. However, it has expressed its willingness — through the NSSP — to at least look the other way. As the US ambassador to India, David Mulford, recently noted, the US does not have any agreement comparable to the NSSP with two other states — Israel and Pakistan — that share India’s anomalous status in the non-proliferation order. That the administration has consented to such a unique covenant speaks volumes for New Delhi’s importance in the president’s geopolitical calculations.

The NSSP is therefore revolutionary, even if it is conservative in that it heralds changes in US policy, but not revisions of US commitments to the global non-proliferation regime or alterations in US law. Indian critics have seized upon this fact to dismiss the NSSP as inconsequential. Such a response misses the point. To begin with, even by changing extant US policy regarding cooperation with India in this quartet of issues, the Bush administration has shifted course in a way that none of its predecessors dared to and which no Democratic administration would have. Further, as NSSP implementation begins to yield benefits to both sides, there is no reason why the administration cannot make even more consequential changes in policy than it has done already. The current agreement, therefore, ought not to be viewed as a waypoint towards even greater partnership in the future. It is important to note that during discussions leading up to the NSSP, some entities within the inter-agency debate in Washington were willing to consider pursuing changes to US law and international regime commitments in order to accommodate India. This effort ran out of steam when New Delhi chose, for its own reasons, not to send Indian troops to assist American stabilisation efforts in Iraq. In any event, future changes to US law and regime commitments vis-a-vis India are possible if: the current agreement is successfully implemented in the interim; US-India ties continue to deepen in fundamental ways of importance to both sides; a risk-acceptant regime, like the current Bush administration, continues to hold office in Washington.

Even if these alterations do not occur, future administrations could become much more liberal in regards to India’s access to controlled commodities through more ambitious policy changes. For that, both sides would have to grow in mutual trust. The current accord offers a vital ingredient that makes this possible. By incorporating a series of reciprocal obligations, complemented by regular high-level discussions about implementation, the NSSP creates a structured process that allows both parties to confront difficulties expeditiously and thereby build the confidence required to encourage the US government to make further policy changes. But this objective will certainly not be advanced if we continue to miss the forest for the trees and overlook the revolutionary possibilities that the NSSP embodies for future US-India relations.

The writer is with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. He was a senior advisor to the US ambassador in New Delhi