Long-range plans that could go awry

When Washington announced the BMD programme in 2001 and then withdrew from ABM Treaty, Russia responded cautiously. It used the opportunity to augment its strategic missile programmes. But the US decision to deploy interceptors in Russia’s backyard was simply not acceptable to Moscow, because it was seen as directly negating Russia’s nuclear deterrence as well as challenging its military superiority in the region. Although Moscow has periodically issued warnings on giving “adequate responses”, the US seems to think Topol-M would be the sole answer, which the Russians were to deploy in large numbers. With the testing of the RS-24 — touted as an advanced version of Topol-M with multiple warhead capability — notice has been served on Washington.

Washington has tried to allay Russian fears by stating that the shield would not be operational before 2012 and would target only Iran or ‘other rogue states’. Which are these ‘other’ rogue states? While North Korea is a natural qualifier, why would Washington need ground-based mid-course interceptors (tailored to intercept long-range missiles outside the earth’s atmosphere) in East Europe to shoot down short-range missiles from the neighbouring Middle East? A potential threat from North Korea’s medium- or interim-range missiles certainly demands a mid-course interception capability. But Europe would hardly be targeted by North Korea unless a weapon system deployed in Eastern Europe directly intimidates Pyongyang. But an interception capability that can target North Korean missiles from Europe would have easy coverage over Russia as well as China, thereby negating their deterrence capabilities.

North Korea missiles pose a threat to the US to its west. Its main missile inventory comprising the short-range Scud-B can be intercepted by theatre defence systems like the Patriot Advanced Capability system deployed in Japan, South Korea. Pyongyang’s longer-range missiles like Nodong and the Taepodong are yet to have an operational reach over the US, while the two-stage Taepodong-2 is supposed to have the range to hit Alaska with smaller payloads. For such threats, interception systems like Arrow-II and the Theatre High-Altitude Area Defence system, with upper-endo-atmospheric interception capability, are sufficient. For a mid-course interception, ground-based interceptors deployed in Fort Greely and Vandenberg could be used. At the same time, the PAC systems deployed in Israel or Turkey and the Arrow-II system deployed in Israel are capable of meeting missile threats from the Middle East.

Washington is inviting trouble by planning to deploy mid-course interception systems to meet threats that can be tackled by theatre defences. Longer-range interceptors, if deployed at the Eurasian borders, would negate strategic deterrence with Russia and provoke an offensive response from Russia as well as China. Washington too seems to have bitten more than it can chew. After dragging Russia into a serious military competition, the Bush administration runs the risk of provoking China not just through the East European BMD, but with its planned regional missile shield in East Asia. Despite President Bush’s smooth talk at the G8 Summit, and NATO leaders stepping in to defuse tensions, the US’s determination to move forward on its missile defence architecture would inevitability trigger a security dilemma among other powers in the region. This new arms race could indeed usher in a Cold War-like scenario.

The writer is with IDSA, Delhi