Let’s talk to the general

The core question is: what is in India’s interest — to talk or not to talk? I have no doubt that it is in India’s interest to talk. Of course, we can take the position that there will be no talks till Pakistan has met a number of conditions such as a substantial reduction in the rate of infiltration, dismantling of terrorists’ training camps and so on. Such an approach will be unwise for two reasons. First, just because we refuse to talk, Musharraf is not going to do what we are asking him to do. Secondly, our not talking does not make him pay any price that he cannot afford to pay.

In fact, continued confrontation with India might be in his interest, especially in post-election Pakistan, where the pro-Taliban, anti-American coalition (MMA) has emerged as the majority party in the NWFP and Baluchistan and might be part of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. Even if he were willing, Musharraf will not be able to do much about reducing, forget eliminating, cross-border terrorism. I, for one, do not believe that he is keen to stop it. He will do what is in his interest and his interest is to remain in power as long as possible. Therefore, unless New Delhi wishes to support the general, it should talk to Pakistan now.

The decision to talk does not necessarily imply that concomitantly India should send its high commissioner back to Islamabad. Such a step should be based on the progress of the talks. Of course, a case can be made out that the recall of the high commissioner has been subject to the law of diminishing returns and, therefore, he should be sent back. But in terms of effective signalling, such a decision should not be taken now. The all-important question is: what should India and Pakistan talk about?

Our leaders have been using a formulation that gives advantage to Pakistan. Taken from the unfortunate Simla Agreement, it is lays down that India is prepared to sit down and talk with Pakistan on all outstanding differences including J&K. Such a formulation gives the wrong impression that Kashmir is the core problem. Granted that Kashmir is ‘in the blood’ of Pakistanis, as Musharraf put it, and that India and Pakistan fought a war over it within months of independence. But it does not logically follow that Kashmir is the core problem. At a deeper level, the core problem is Pakistan’s consistent refusal to be a reasonable neighbour. What is happening in and about Kashmir is the core symptom of that malady. To balance the picture, it should be added that there are hawks in India who urge the government to behave as a bad neighbor but, fortunately, their advice is rarely heeded.

The convoluted rhetoric about a ‘composite dialogue’ has only confused the issue. It has been India’s turn to propose more trade and Pakistan has behaved as though it were conferring a favour by agreeing even to discuss the matter. All this has to change. India should tell Pakistan, and let the rest of the world know, that she is prepared to discuss the entire gamut of bilateral relationship: trade, cultural exchanges, sharing of water, consular issues, cross-border terrorism in J&K and elsewhere, including any ideas Pakistan may have for a definitive — not final solution — to the differences over J&K. No item on the agenda is privileged over others, all are equally important in order to establish and maintain normal neighbourly relations.

(The writer is a retired ambassador)