Let Third Front be

The third front option, as framed by the CPM, is an unambiguous indication that the party is preparing the ground for its way out of its current relationship with the Congress. Its current cohabitation with the UPA has again more to do with strategy than ideology. Statements issued after the 2004 elections indicate that the threat of the BJP and communal forces needed to be thwarted and hence the support for a ‘secular’ government. Secondly, when the Left supported the UPA in May 2004 they had made it certain in no unclear terms that while broadly endorsing the common minimum programme, they would not necessarily endorse its economic policies and would advocate alternative policies while continuing to support the government.

Given this background, today the UPA government cannot claim Left unpredictability and obstinacy for their problems. There was enough space to estimate actions and reactions in advance, be it on foreign policy or on economic issues. At the same time, the Left cannot claim the moral high ground that theirs was an ideological standpoint. The UPA-Left relationship was strategically moulded and if there is a logjam today, it represents the failure on the part of both sides to have developed a working relationship despite having begun well.

All fronts and alliances, whether it is the NDA, the UPA or the third front UNPA, are therefore likely to be based more on strategic considerations rather than ideology. Even in a programmatic relationship like that of the Left Front in Kerala, strategic considerations rather than ideology have played a key role in sewing up alliances.

The question, then, is this: why does strategy triumph ideology? The easy way out would be to blame it on culture. Culture, however, is a clearly inadequate explanatory variable. For a more cogent understanding of why ‘we are like that only’, it would be prudent to map some of the long term trends in Indian politics and look at the constraints and opportunities presented by the institutional framework in which Indian politics operates.

Four trends that have become clear since 2004 are: the emergence of a competitive multiparty system at the national level and a decline in the support for the two polity-wide parties, the BJP and Congress; that no single party will be able to form a government at the Centre on its own; the emergence of a competitive multiparty system even at the state level in most states; and regionalisation of politics with election results being based more on issues of local significance than on ideological considerations. These trends undeniably favour ideological flexibility and strategic acumen.

The lack of internal democracy in parties makes the individual rather than organisation matter. Consequently, moves and countermoves, statements and values are geared to protect the personal interests of those at the helm rather than the party’s ‘interest’. Ideology, then, becomes a cover for other reasons.

Finally, a key feature of the party system that has almost stubbornly refused to change over the years has been the state-focused patronage-based mobilisation pattern by nearly all political parties. Inaugurated by the Congress, this particular mobilisation technique has been ritually followed by the other parties. Ideology hardly matters when patronage is key. Furthermore, the single member plurality system of electoral laws and the federal system encourage electoral coalitions and seat adjustments based on territorial considerations rather than ideological positions. Given these conditions, strategy easily trumps ideology.

Howsoever much Karat’s third front thesis may want ideology to lead, it is more likely that passengers are attracted to fronts primarily for strategic reasons. However, having said that, as we move closer to 2009, the shape that the third front takes and the role it chooses to play will no doubt play a key role in deciding the final outcome.

The writer teaches political science at Panjab University, Chandigarh