King, Maobaadi and Democracy

The response of the royal regime to worldwide disapproval has been to warn of a Maoist victory if support is not forthcoming. This attempt at blackmail, itself uncouth, betrays a lack of confidence in the Royal Nepali Army’s (RNA’s) ability to confront the Maoists. More importantly, the claim is incorrect. Knowledgeable analysts and army generals confirm the possibility of a rebel takeover is just not there. While it is true that Maoists have the run of the countryside because of mid-hill geography and their ability to instil fear among the peasantry, they do not control the landscape. They have not been able to develop so-called base areas, and not one of the 75 district headquarters of Nepal has fallen to them. An unprepared RNA, dragged out of the barracks on November ’02 to battle them, has been guilty of widespread abuses and of perpetuating collateral damage. But specialised training and infusion of American and Indian arms have improved its fighting ability, and the rebels’ spectacular attacks on army/police garrisons seem now to be a thing of the past. Their response has been a shift to highway ambushes, blockades, school closures and disruption of commercial/industrial activity.

All this may well make Nepal ungovernable, but it will not lead to the collapse of the state when there is so little of the state out there beyond the urban centres. The Maoists have lost some of their best fighters over the last year. Recruitment is tough because large parts of rural Nepal have been emptied of young men fleeing conscription. The motley array of guns at the Maoists’ command also casts doubt on their ability to succeed in conventional combat. Tighter controls by India have made it difficult for the rebels to use Indian territory as a staging ground, and there is credible information of division within the Maoist leadership on matters of strategy. Guerilla leaders would know that there is no winning this war and it is important to try and bring them to a ‘safe landing’ before they fracture into warlordism. There are even indications that the leaders seek such a landing, but a palace bent on victory would not even be willing to call their bluff.

Notwithstanding the romanticising of the Maoists by a few, there is no doubt that the rebels have pushed Nepal backward in the name of armed revolution. It was they who started raising arms against a democratic state, making India loom larger than ever over Nepal, bringing the military out, shattering the economy and retarding the development process. King Gyanendra’s takeover, let it be said, has simply accelerated the downturn in each of these spheres.

The political parties have not yet been able to mount a spirited campaign against the coup. They are meant to function under parliamentary structures, but the absence of Parliament since ’02 has made cooperation problematic, not to mention a palace working overtime to exploit inter-party differences. After February 1, they were left in disarray with the king jailing senior leaders in the name of ‘saving democracy’ (many remain in jail). Each of them has also been trying to tackle internal contradictions. Many party bosses were compromised for having joined earlier governments appointed by the king, and internal power plays are in progress. There are also divisions between those who call for a fight-to-finish for a king-less republic, those who would like to see a ceremonial monarchy retained, and others who regard the army-backed royal palace as too powerful to confront.

The parties have been debilitated by years of propaganda about the supposed ‘failure of democracy’ since ’90, and accusations of corruption. While Nepal’s politicians are no exception when it comes to malfeasance on the job, one has to keep a little perspective on this. They do shine when compared to the monarchy’s 30 years of misrule that was ended in ’90. The fact is that the parliamentary exercise since then for the first time wrested political power from the Kathmandu Valley and distributed it among the districts. This explains why the parties are detested by a certain section. The reality is that the democratic interlude heralded rapid advance in social/economic indicators, and ushered the rise of ethnic and regional assertion against dominant elites, full media freedom, the doubling of the rural roads network, spread of telecommunications, and the opening up of overseas employment which has sustained the economy in these lean times. Nepalis became confident in challenging authority, and the flavour of freedom made Kathmandu an attractive meeting place for South Asians from all over.

The king prefers to confuse political parties with political pluralism, and the misdeeds of one are supposed to stain the other. His choice of fellow travellers are ultra-conservatives from the earliest Panchayat raj. It shows a yearning for a time when the king could claim to speak for the people. Having been maligned, misused and attacked by the king, the parties have taken their time but are beginning to regroup. Today, there is a dynamic process underway on how best to bring back democracy, and the distrust of the palace has become the unifying factor.

The international community, including India, has by its acts and statements acted as a bulwark for democracy and pluralism. This shows respect for the people of Nepal. At this crucial juncture, democratic governments must stay the course and not provide any support/succour to the king. Most important, they must not fall for the ruse that the rebels will win if the king is not allowed free reign. Nepal’s king may not like political parties, but there is no need for others to fall in line. Nepal’s politicians are the truest representatives of the people, more than the palace, the army, or civil society combines, and it is they who will have to deliver a negotiated peace to a wounded people while leading them back on the path to pluralism.

The writer edits ‘Himal’, a South Asian monthly, published from Kathmandu