Kalahandi calling

Sen’s Orissa connection is two-fold: Along with scholar Prasant Pattanaik, he found out the theory of eliminating intransivity that is suppression of minorityby the majority in a system. And the now infamous Kalahandi Syndrome — the drought and bumper crop phenomenon.

An inevitable sequel to the insensitivity and absurdity of the food security system is: around 300 million go to bed underfed everyday.

The country now produces enough to feed those in the remotest villages. But like the famous `trickle-down’ cliche, everything has come too little and too late. According to noted economist C. Hanumantha Rao, when most of the Third World countries imported food, “India stabilised public purchases of foodgrains at the level of 10 to 12 per cent output, and built up adequate quantities of stock.”

But this good show has not altered the household level problem of under-nutrition in India. And once again, India depends on farmers from abroad for wheat while it rots in Punjab.

Till the Seventh Plan, it apparently never dawned on those in the Yojana Bhavan that poverty is more confined to the villages than the urban conglomerate. As analysts say: “Maybe theplanners thought since it is the rural folk that produce the crop, they must be getting enough to eat.” This attitude failed a pragmatic food delivery system that would have otherwise taken care of the daily concerns of the poorest of the poor.

It was only in the Seventh Plan that the concept of an expanded food security system was thought upon. It stressed on public procurement, buffer stocking and public distribution, and also chalked out a strategy to scale down inflationary pressures that squeeze the rural poor.

The role of PDS was thus sought to be widened. From just an interventionist strategy, it was looked upon as a permanent feature of a system to achieve an equitable distribution of essential goods. And its target became poverty pockets to supplement the welfare programmes.

“The PDS”, said the Seventh Plan Approach Paper, “will be a permanent feature of the strategy to control prices, reduce fluctuations and achieve equitable distribution of essential goods … the main thrust of theexpansion will be in the remote and inaccessible areas, so that the PDS becomes supplementary to the poverty alleviation programmes.”

All these have failed to deliver. The system’s failure, on the other hand, is directly aiding and abetting the dire poverty. First, it has not delivered essential commodities to meet the minimum food requirements of the rural poor. In 1983, `the drought year of the century’, a record 11 million tonnes of foodgrains was distributed through PDS. Interestingly, the large chunk of it went to those States dominated by the urban areas despite the fact that drought is a rural phenomenon. Barring a few, in all States large-scale despatch by the Centre stands no guarantee that it will eventually find its way to the poor’s kitchen.

However, of late, the continuing distress migration — from drought-hit villages to the `promising’ mega cities — has upset the system. By 2010, the number of migrants in Indian cities would reach the population of UK, Germany and France puttogether.

The PDS allotment does not necessarily control prices in the open market to suit the poor. As per the National Sample Survey, the bottom 20 per cent of the rural and urban poor purchases only 16 and 21 per cent of their food requirement from the PDS; the rest are forced to depend on the open market irrespective of rates. This prompts officials to conclude that there is no PDS demand in rural areas. Untimely arrival of rice and the compulsion of purchasing the entire monthly quota at a time, force the poor to solely depend on the open market.

Foodgrains do not always reach the rural daily wage earners working in various employment generation schemes. Though National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) are Rural Employment Generation Programme (RLEGP) were considered departmental programmes, they are virtually carried out by private contractors. They decide how much foodgrains to be distributed when and how.

The result: When plenty of food is available in the country, people still go hungry inrural India.

The bumper crop phenomenon has not fundamentally altered the condition of the needy. As found out in surveys in drought-hit areas, a village that survives on government kitchen has produced a bumper crop next year. But the harvest lasts for a few months because of old debts and the vicious circle of poverty continues — the typical Kalahandi Syndrome.

Despite a heavy buffer stock, food security for the poor and the ultra-poor has little meaning. If the granaries are overflowing it is because the poor are unable to buy.

Kalahandi, for the Food Corporation of India, is a rice-bowl with an annual contribution of 250,000 tonnes. Yet, it remains another example of penury and starvation.