It’ll take more than a Sukhoi

Doubts are already being expressed in military aeronautical circles about the feasibility of this Indo-Russian venture. Given the small numbers, the principle of economies of scale cannot be applied, resulting in higher production cost per unit. The cost effectiveness of such indigenous aircraft manufacture remains to be seen.

Significantly, the Su30MK signals the IAF’s first, albeit incomplete, step towards a strategic air force. Currently, the IAF remains a tactical air force which cannot project air power too far beyond the national boundaries. Air power is essentially an offensive concept and an air war can be won only over enemy airspace. To be an effective instrument of war, fighter aircraft need to destroy strategic targets like dams, industries, railways, power stations and other such economic assets which diminish the enemy’s will to wage war. In this context, the Su30MK has the range to penetrate deep into hostile territory.

Also, the Su30MK’s range proves useful in stationing it far away from border areas which otherwise would be within easy reach of enemy aircraft. During a hot war, proximity to the border makes airbases vulnerable to runway denial bombs which effectively restricts those aircraft from operating against an enemy. This minimises air-power capability.

To get real value for money from the Su30MKs, the IAF would have to get an Awacs (airborne warning and control systems) or an eye-in-the-sky in order to fight an air war effectively. This system can identify and track enemy aircraft in terms of speed, position and direction thereby alerting one’s own aircraft and accordingly optimising their engagement. The Government is seriously considering equipping the IAF with Awacs to ensure an effective deterrent against persisting aerial threats from across the borders. Does the Su30MK imply a change in air warfare doctrine? In the post-Gulf War period, air war doctrines are being re-written to handle the evolving technological advances. Defence planners have hitherto perceived air-power in a secondary role supportive of military/naval power.

According to a Rand Corporation (a US based strategic studies think tank) study by George Tanham and Marcy Agmon, The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects comments the impact of the Gulf War, “…has not appeared to improve the IAF’s political position in the Indian security community, nor has it spurred it to plan for a greater role for air-power in India’s defence.” Perhaps the IAF’s Su30MK will prove the US analysts wrong.India acquired the Su30MKs largely to counter China’s purchase of the older Su27s with manufacturing facilities from Russia. The former Chief of Air Staff S.K. Kaul during his tenure had gone on record to state that India may have to cope with a potential Chinese threat. By 2000 India would have 30 Su30MKs compared to China’s 150-200 Su27/30s. While India has the fifth largest air force, China possesses the third largest one in the world. The Su30MK, considered to be superior to the US F15E fighter, is a versatile aircraft capable of multi-roles like air defence and bombing missions. The aircraft is equipped with armaments for both air interdiction and bombing roles, besides electronic warfare (EW) pods. This enables the aircraft to carry out a strike independently without any accompanying aircraft. Normally other fighters would require a strike `package’ comprising air defence aircraft, EW aircraft and `decoy’ aircraft for a mission. Whereas the Su30MK on a mission can operate alone and thus save on support aircraft.

The Su30MK as an unladen aircraft has a 3000 km-range, additional payload, either armament or EW pods — on any of the dozen hardpoints — will increase external drag surfaces thus resulting in higher fuel consumption and reduction in flying distance.

The IAF procuring the Su30MK state-of-the-art fighters is a critical dimension to air-power capability. The other equally important dimensions are: manpower, training, ground-based air defence systems, airlift capability, spares support, engineering expertise and air intelligence capability.

Internationally laid down air force standards for pilot to aircraft ratio is 2.5 to 1. This man-machine level enhances aircraft utilisation rates during war when a pilot should not fly more than two sorties per day. The IAF figure is lower than specified. To econo-mise on flight training and saving sorties, aircraft simulators are essential to improve operational efficiency, particularly weapons delivery skills. This will, however, have to wait till the Su30MKs are inducted and only then the configurations will become clear.

In air defence systems, the IAF has to fill in several gaps as is evident from the aerial intrusions over Gujarat by a remotely piloted vehicle this past January. Coming to airlift capability, the IAF with six transport squadrons (two Il-76 and four An-32) can only para-drop/air transport a single Army battalion behind enemy lines. With the end of Soviet Union, spares support had at one time become weak and a former Air Marshal in January 1995 went on record about the matter.

Undoubtedly, IAF engineering expertise compares with the best in the world. In the 1980s IAF engineers developed a navigation system for Jaguar aircraft at one-third the cost that British Aerospace had quoted. Given the multi-faceted dimensions comprising air-power, the Su30MK alone will not make such a difference to air-power.

In hardware terms the advanced jet trainer, mid-air refuelling tankers (to extend flying by upto 4000 km) and Awacs are equally relevant to complement the new heavy fighter entering No 24 squadron — `The Hawks’, under Wg Cdr V.N. Unnikrishnan of the IAF.

The make or buy optionHAL eventually proposes to indigenously produce 60 Su30MKs after absorbing technology from the Russian manufacturer. Earlier, HAL obtained technology transfer for the MIG27 but has still not become self-reliant as critical, sensitive technologies have been withheld, resulting in poor serviceability of the aircraft. Despite HAL’s license production expertise with the MIG21, India contracted with the Russians for its upgradation.

A similar situation is bound to occur in the proposed Su30MK programme. Moreover, 60 indigenous aircraft will not be an economical proposition considering that aeronautical majors usually opt for serial production running into at least a few hundreds in order to achieve economies of scale.HAL’s production cost would be much higher than purchasing from the Russians and all for nothing. The Russians, in the contract, have offered to sell India 30 Su30MKs for Rs 3,900 crore in 2001 whereas HAL would not be able to produce at less than this figure. HAL has projected an initial provisional investment of Rs 3,000 crore which includes a 25 per cent advance for 30 aircraft.

Capital investments in machinery, upgradation of existing facilities, license fees, technology transfer charges, cost of imported material cannot be a viable investment to produce just 60 aircraft.