Iraq isn’t Vietnam, but they rhyme

• ‘‘Our military is confronting terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other places so our people will not have to confront terrorist violence in New York or St. Louis or Los Angeles.’

George W. Bush, Aug. 26, 2003

• ‘‘If we don’t stop the Reds in South Vietnam, tomorrow they will be in Hawaii, and next week they will be in San Francisco.’’

Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966

Two beleaguered presidents, each hyping his unpopular war, suggest how these two episodes can turn out to be similar in their effects. The war in Southeast Asia was Topic A for three successive presidential elections, from 1964 though 1972. Iraq seems destined for a similar role in 2004.

In a domestic context, there are many similarities between the two: Disputed and inaccurate intelligence, molded for political purposes, created pretexts for both wars; each caused deep divisions in the country; and pro-war presidents draped themselves in the flag and preached the stark necessity of their war, while promising its speedy, successful conclusion.

Thinking about the similarities as well as the differences is instructive. Particularly because we did experience Vietnam — a fact that sets us apart from our compatriots of the 1960s, who didn’t have the benefit of an earlier, comparable event to learn from — we can anticipate some of the danger signs.

Militarily, the comparison of Iraq to Vietnam won’t take us very far. Consider: In Vietnam the enemy was formidable: the Vietminh, the communist and nationalist movement that defeated the French army to win North Vietnam’s independence. The Vietminh were seen by many Vietnamese as legitimate guardians of their national identity. The Vietminh saw the United States as yet another colonial power trying to deprive the Vietnamese of their sovereignty.

The communists’ supply network began in the Soviet Union and China, huge industrial powers committed to providing whatever material support the Vietminh needed. They had sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, especially along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through both those countries, which allowed them to deliver Soviet and Chinese supplies to troops fighting Americans in the South. To try to counter all this, the United States sent 550,000 troops to South Vietnam at the peak of the war (vs. 130,000 at present in Iraq), conducted massive bombing campaigns, built enormous military bases in South Vietnam and installed Americans in every district of every province. And still, US forces had their hands full with a ferocious North Vietnamese army unintimidated by the Americans’ firepower and helicopters.

The bands of Iraqis who are killing Americans appear to have plenty of ammunition, at least for now, but they have no resupply network comparable to North Vietnam’s. They have no organised military units. There will be no set-piece battles in Iraq. After 10 months in Iraq, the United States has lost 471 soldiers. In the first 10 months after combat troops landed in Vietnam, the death toll was almost 2,000. Ultimately, more than 58,300 Americans lost their lives in Vietnam — half the number of Yanks killed in World War I, a huge number that no one expects from this Iraq war.

The contexts for the two wars are also very different. The subtext for Vietnam was the Cold War. Defeating North Vietnam was seen by US officials (though not by our European and Asian allies) as part of the policy of containing communism. We feared that a defeat in Vietnam would be followed by the fall of other Asian countries to communism — the ‘‘domino theory,’’ which happily proved unfounded after we finally did lose in Vietnam in 1975.

As retired Army Gen. William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, put it in a recent interview, there was intense pressure on Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to stand and fight in Vietnam. In contrast, Iraq really was a war of choice for the Bush administration. Attacking Iraq never enjoyed the level of public support that the war in Vietnam did initially. And yet, there is a way in which Iraq is like Vietnam, one worth thinking about. It involves ends and means, credibility and capability.

Even before war began, the administration was looking for ways to use it politically. The president’s chief political adviser, Karl Rove, said in January 2002 that Americans ‘‘trust the Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America’s military might and thereby protecting America.’’ The congressional resolution authorising Bush to go to war was rushed through in October 2002 before the midterm elections. ‘‘People are going to want to know, before the elections, where their representatives stand,’’ explained Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia, then chairman of the National Republican Congres- sional Committee.

Political considerations have also seemed to affect the administration’s views on paying for the war— as they affected Johnson’s in the 1960s. For months the Bush White House refused to speculate on costs. It ruled out any tax increase for the war, which already has added a hundred billion dollars or more to the deficit. Johnson would not raise taxes enough to pay for Vietnam, creating imbalances in the economy that contributed to more than a decade of inflation.

Vietnam undermined the US economy, nearly destroyed the US Army and contributed to a generation or more of public cynicism and distrust of government. There are no grounds today for predicting consequences as grave from the war in Iraq. Indeed, a successful outcome, including a new democratic Iraq, remains possible. But the rhymes should give us pause.

(The author, an associate editor of The Washington Post, covered the Vietnam War in 1969 and 1970.)

-LA Times-Washington Post