As India and Pakistan stand on a razor’s edge, it is vital to see how we go there. In this great game, there is much that goes on behind the scenes—unseen, unheard, unreported, and classified. Last year, Fakir Syed Aijazuddin, a Pakistani chartered accountant, spent months at archives in the US sifting through piles of secret briefings and conversations relating to the 1971 war for his new book, The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974. The author shared a pre-release copy with The Indian Express. The first in the series of exclusive excerpts rewinds to two conversations between Dr Henry Kissinger, then adviser to US President Richard Nixon, and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai on the afternoon of July 10, 1971, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. EN-LAI: In other words, tension is also chaos. In our view, in the twenty-five years since World War II, the world has all along been in turmoil, the present has not yet settled down and is still in turmoil. In the example that you mentioned yesterday, the possibility that India will attack Pakistan in South Asia, from news which we received today it seems that the tense atmosphere has been stepped up. KISSINGER: Has something new happened? EN-LAI: There has been more propaganda from the Indian side. I also said yesterday that we believed that such a possibility existed. The question of India is a question in which you two big powers, the US and the USSR, are taking a hand in. KISSINGER: We (the US) taking a hand? EN-LAI: You are taking an interest in the affair because, as you said yesterday, you warned India when you went there. Of course, the Soviet union has also declared that it hopes that the two sides (India and Pakistan) will reach conciliation. Didn’t they (the Soviets) issue the so-called Tashkent Declaration before? But these are only superficial things. With India able to get such a large amount of military equipment, it will take expansionist turns. KISSINGER: Mr Prime, Minister, India doesn’t get arms from us. EN-LAI: That’s what I have heard, but you are giving Pakistan some equipment. KISSINGER: Yes, but so are you. EN-LAI: We do so because India committed aggression against Pakistan. They also committed aggression against us, too, as you said yesterday. KISSINGER: No, you mentioned it. EN-LAI: . in accordance with Nehru’s traditional thinking as expressed in the book, Discovery of India. So with respect to the issue of the South Asian subcontinent, this region continues to be in turmoil and is not settling down. The turmoil in East Pakistan in a very great way is due to India. The so-called Government of Bangla Desh set up its headquarters. Isn’t that subversion of the Pakistani Government? KISSINGER: The Prime Minister doesn’t think that we are cooperating with this, does he? EN-LAI: I would not like to draw a conclusion on that at present, but simply want to point out the phenomenon—we cannot but pay attention to this. Perhaps because our attention will be even greater than yours. This issue is before our eyes. In our opinion, if India continues on its present course of disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by. On May Day 1970 Chairman Mao met the Indian Charge on the Tien An Men, and he suggested that we exchange ambassadors speedily. Actually, that could have been done, and we are prepared to do it now. They asked us to send our ambassador first, which was no great problem, but they have been spreading rumours throughout the world that they are going to seek out the Chinese for negotiations and there haven’t been any. They are just spreading rumours. Of course, when one speaks of the South Asian subcontinent, this mainly means India and Pakistan. However, China also has a part there. You said you were pressing India not to provoke a disturbance, and we also believe that you would like to improve your relations with Pakistan. I believe that you probably did say to India what you told us. We also support your opinion, that is advise India not to provoke a disturbance, because President Yahya Khan is most concerned about the situation. For its part, Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance because in all military situations, Pakistan is in a weaker position than India. We can bear witness to that fact because we have contacts in such a sense with India, and if India is going to go ahead and provoke disturbances in the subcontinent, then India itself will be the victim. India, I believe, is one of the countries most heavily in debt, and it also well known that the life of the Indian people is not easy—if such a disturbance is created, they will be the victims. Those who suffer will also be the rulers of India. KISSINGER: Mr Prime Minister, with respect to South Asia, I think our analysis is not too different from yours. We have, of course, friendly relations with India, and we have given, in conjunction with other countries, substantial economic assistance. We have not given any military assistance of any kind since 1965. In connection with East Pakistan, we have some given humanitarian aid to help the refugees. You know from President Yahya Khan the strong friendship we feel for him and his country. We strongly oppose any military action to solve the problems of East Pakistan. And if India takes action in East Pakistan, we strongly oppose any military action and publicly disapprove of it. Furthermore, we would under no circumstances encourage military adventures against the People’s Republic of China. Now would we permit the indirect use of our aid for such purposes. We want the people of India to develop their own future, but we also want them to leave their neighbours alone. EN-LAI: It’s also possible to misunderstand the origins of the Sino-Indian conflict. KISSINGER:That’s possible. EN-LAI: The Indians said that we created the Ladakh incident. It occurred on a peak of the Karakorums on the Aksai-chin Plateau of Sinkiang. At this point a ridge of the Karakorums falls off very sharply downward on the Kashmir side. The elevation is very high and even the Soviet helicopters used by the Indians could only gradually work their way up the steep slope. Our people were on top of this ridge and could see down on the Soviet helicopters gradually coming up. The Aksai-chin Plateau is the route along which we is the route along which we have to travel when crossing from Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet. The height of the plateau is 5000 meters. We started to build this highway in 1951. KISSINGER: The Indians call this region Ladakh. EN-LAI: Ladakh is farther below, but the Indians call all of this region Ladakh. Even the British colonial maps do not show this as part of India, and Nehru was only able to provide a claim on the basis of a map drawn by a British traveller. Even three years after the road was built, Nehru didn’t know about it. It runs all the way from Western Sinkiang to Ali district of Tibet. In my discussions with Nehru on the Sino-Indian boundary in 1956 he suddenly raised the issue of the road. I said, ‘‘You didn’t even know we were building a road the last three years, and now you suddenly say that it is your territory’’. I remarked upon how strange this was. Although the so-called McMahon Line was a line that no Chinese government ever recognised, at least it was a line drawn by a Britisher, even though in drawing it he included more than 90,000 square kilometres of our territory in India. However, in the western sector there was no such line. There was no agreement with us either in 1956 or 1957. And so in 1959 the Indians sent small patrols crawling up the steep slopes to attack our post. Our guards were at the passes. This was in December and the weather was extremely cold—40 degree below zero. Our post was in the form of a fort and we could see them climbing up. So when the Indians attacked they suffered more heavy losses than we. However, we did have some wounded, and we raised a protest with the Indian government. TASS said of this incident that the Chinese committed aggression against India, Khrushschev, without inquiring, took the same position on the grounds that the Indians had suffered such heavy casualties. This was the first such anti-China statement from the USSR. (Tomorrow: Kissinger and En-lai discuss India’s ‘miscalculations in East Pakistan’)
