In deterrence, size does matter

Let us calculate what it would take to deter China. This in no way implies agreement with strategists who have cast China as an adversary. China is a very large country with 1.2 billion people. It has more than 200 major cities and industrial centres. Would it be deterred by the threat to destroy 10 percent of its population and 20 percent of its industry? The answer is: probably not, because China hasenough residual capacity left to keep going.

In fact, no one except the Chinese can answer that question. Outsiders can only speculate on such a subjective issue. All we can know is that historical, social, cultural, philosophical and political factors have made the Chinese extremely resilient. When 20 million Chinese died of famine in the Seventies, there was hardly a ripple on the Chinese public’s face. Such historical experience tends to drive up calculations of damage in percentage terms and leads to an upward revision in the size of the deterrent forces. In this case, it would mean having enough capacity to destroy 15 percent of the population and 30 percent of industrial capacity. But these are only notional figures, designed solely to demonstrate an internal dynamic.

To inflict this degree of notional damage on China, 40-50 strategic warheads in the 5-10-megaton range will have to be detonated over China’s cities and industrial centres. This figure would rise with warheads of lower yields.

Thereare several ways in which survivable nuclear forces can be created. The most effective is to build a fleet of six to eight nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles and keep two to three on station at any time. But we are at least 20 years away from such technologies. The second method is to create a force of mobile, land-based missiles which keep changing location on an underground rail network. Again, creating such a system is very costly: even the US abandoned such a project. A third option is to field quick-reacting missiles and aircraft which can be launched on warning that enemy missiles are on their way. But, as in the case of Pakistani missiles, Chinese missiles launched from Tibet would arrive with little or no warning, catching our missiles and aircraft on the ground before they are up and away.

A fourth option is to house missiles in hardened, underground silos located in narrow mountain valleys. They may be relatively safe from missile attack here but will remain vulnerable to verticalattack by bomber aircraft. Thus, even in this option a large portion of the deterrent force may not survive a disarming first strike and the smaller it is, the smaller its chances of survival. So there may be no option but to increase the size of the deterrent force to ensure an adequate residual capacity for retaliation. This may result in a 50-100 percent increase in the size of the deterrent.

With the inter-play of these factors, India’s minimum deterrent may end up with 250-300 strategic warheads and launchers. The need to deter Pakistan may not add much to these figures, but will certainly not subtract from them. This gives rise to the suspicion that the estimates of 40-50 warheads were designed to allay fears of a cost spiral.

The figure of 250-300 warheads and launchers is only a notional one. It could be revised downward or upward. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate that an overt nuclear capability, even at the level of minimum deterrence, is subject to tendencies which work towards an upwardrevision in the size of the deterrent. If these are not taken into account, the deterrent loses credibility and fails to deter. And if it fails, it never was a deterrent.

The writer is a retired brigadier