‘If West Pakistan question isn’t resolved, there’s bound to be trouble in the future’

“The next meeting between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai took place on 23 February 1972. The situation in the subcontinent dominated the early part of the meeting. Both Nixon and En-lai for different reasons, shared an antipathy towards India and suspected that its aspirations to be acknowledged as the pre-eminent power in the region were a cover for hegemony. Each expressed candid and unusually strong opinions during their meeting…”

Nixon: Did Chairman Mao make all the strategic and tactical decisions or did he have a staff organization?
Chou: Yes. I could be considered one of the members of his staff at the time. But it was Chairman Mao who took the initiative on how far we should march every day and where we should stay the night.
Nixon: We hope we have no necessity of facing you in battle after hearing that description.
Chou: I don’t think that will happen. I hope it won’t.
Nixon: It won’t.
Chou: You know our policy. We don’t disguise our policy. We support revolutions waged by the peoples of the world, but we don’t send a single soldier abroad. The revolution of any country must depend on the people of their country.
That was the case with George Washington, in your eight-year war of independence. Of course, at that time you had the assistance of the volunteers of Lafayette; they were not troops sent by the State of France. Also Abraham Lincoln in his Civil War had volunteers. He was defeated in many battles, but he was finally able to turn the tide of battle. He was able because he relied on the people.
And although our philosophies differ, we think in managing our state relations we should act in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence… Actually the five principles were put forward by us, and Nehru agreed. But later on he didn’t implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr Kissinger, I mentioned a book by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.
Nixon: I read the book.
Kissinger: I gave it to the President.
Nixon: I committed a faux pas — Dr Kissinger said it was — but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the war, I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn’t react very favourably when I said that.(Chou laughs)
Chou: Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn’t faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev…. He encouraged them. In looking at 1962, the events actually began in 1959. Why did he go to Camp David? In June of that year, before he went to Camp David, he unilaterally tore up the nuclear agreements between China and the Soviet Union. And after that there were clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the western part of Sinkiang, the Ak-sai Chin area. In that part of Sinkiang province there is a high plateau. The Indian-occupied territory was at the foot of the Karakorums, and the disputed territory was on the slope in between.
Kissinger: It’s what they call Ladakh.
Nixon: They attacked up the mountains.
Chou: We fought them and beat them back, with many wounded. But the Tass Agency said that China had committed the aggression against India. After saying that, Khrushchev went to Camp David. And after he came back from Camp David he went to Peking. The day after the banquet he went to see Chairman Mao.
Our Foreign Minister was Marshal Chen Yi, who has now passed away. Marshal Yi asked him: ‘‘Whey didn’t you ask us before releasing your news account? Why did you rely on the Indian press over the Chinese press? Wasn’t that a case of believing in India more than us, a fraternal country?’’
And what did Khrushchev say? ‘‘You are a Marshal and I am only a Lieutenant General, so I will not debate with you.’’ He was also soured, and did not shake hands when he left. But he had no answer to that. He was slightly more polite to me.
Nixon: To the Prime Minister?
Chou: Yes. He said: ‘‘The casualties on the Indian side were greater than yours, so that’s why I believe they were the victims of aggression.’’ If the side with the more casualties is to be considered the victim of aggression, what logic would that be? For example, at the end of the Second World War, Hitler’s troops were all casualties or taken prisoner, and that means Hitler was the victim of aggression. They just don’t want to listen to reason.
Anyway, the TASS Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t sent our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon Line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon Line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused. He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out. You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.
Nixon: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question with regard to Bangladesh recognition. We have delayed recognition though Britain and other countries have done so.
Chou: France has also recognised Bangladesh.
Nixon: Before we make a decision on that, we have tried to find the attitude of (Zulfikar Ali) Bhutto. And Bhutto indicated he does not object to recognition. In fact he could see that we would have some advantage in not leaving the field clear to the Soviet Union in that region. It is our understanding that India is supposed to withdraw all its forces from Bangladesh by the 24th of March. And based on what we have for consideration, we have for consideration the possibility of recognising Bangladesh about that time.
Chou: We have always stressed that the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions passed by the United Nations should be implemented, because these have won the support of both our countries and the people of the world.
Nixon: Ten to one.
Chou: In the past, generally speaking there hasn’t been so large a majority vote. After vetoing the resolution three times, the Soviet Union was embarrassed to veto further and could only abstain. Of course, it was finally passed at a rather later date, but it still had some binding moral force. By that time India had already seized East Pakistan, but they stopped their advances toward West Pakistan…
Because of this we truly wish to see them truly withdraw their troops in East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. We wish to see them truly do this and not just with words. Of course they can only do that superficially, because if they get some Bengali forces to remain and join Mujibar Rahman, there would be no way to be sure because the Bengalis all look the same. But that would trouble to the future of India and Mrs Gandhi herself.
The Indians said they have no territorial ambitions, but the development of events is that they have remained in their place and refused to withdraw. Once again we can only cite the events of Indian aggression in the 1962 war. At that time our troops pressed to the foothills quite close to Tezpur in Assam, and when they reached that place, Chairman Mao ordered that all troops should turn back. We turned back to the Indians—this is in Maxwell’s book—and we withdrew all troops back north of the so-called McMahon Line because one must show one can be trusted and must not wait for others to act.
And since she (India) has also agreed to the UN resolution that things should be settled in the eastern part of Bengal, why are they not willing to settle with West Pakistan? At least the issue of West Pakistan should be settled, because if the question of West Pakistan is not resolved there is bound to be a return of trouble in the future. From our point of view, even if the subcontinent were one country there would still be turmoil there, because they have nationality problems there even more complicated than yours that are now covered up. If India took over all of the subcontinent, there would be even more trouble. India is not able to exercise hegemony—that is our philosophy. But speaking from the question of state relations, this should not be done because after all, after the partition Pakistan became an independent country in 1947. This was something left over from Britain.
Nixon: 1949.
Chou: 1947.

(Excerpted from The White House & Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 by Fakir Syed Aijazuddin, OUP)

Read Full Coverage: Diplomacy Declassified