IAF can strike out militants

Based on the hypothesis that “a written doctrine provides a datum from which to make progress and move forward”, the IAF doctrine is described as “The instinctive orientation with which the IAF collectively prepares for and responds to the circumstances of war.”

The primary aim of laying down a doctrine is to shape the IAF for war, declares the document. The Doctrine of the IAF is, therefore, an amalgam of the theories of doctrines, air power and strategy. It is to be used as a guideline on how to undertake air operations, but as the document stressed, a doctrine must be periodically reviewed so that it evolves, thus preventing the institutionalisation of dogma.While the control of the air, or Air Superiority, gets priority in every case as far as the doctrine is concerned, it is, however, the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) that are regarded as crucially important for success in war. “And all effort must be made to create and sustain a viable capability, keeping in mind that SEAD is a role in which specialised weapons, tactics and training play a particularly important role.”Likewise, the doctrine stresses on the urgency of combining the Air Defence network of the three services, for the “failure to integrate AD would invite disastrous consequences in war due to fratricide. This is precisely what the Egyptians did in the 1973 war and as a result shot down 60 of their own aircraft.’

On the structure of the IAF, the doctrine declares that an Air Force which can bank upon space based assets would dramatically improve its abilities to prosecute war and with minimal risk. “Therefore, in the years to come, the IAF must work toward exploitation of space to enhance its capabilities.”

Similarly, the doctrine asserts that Advanced Early Warning and Control aircraft allow for far more effective area defence and at the same time “provides greater defence in depth and a favourable force to space ratio. The acquisition of such an asset, therefore, is essential for the IAF.”

On the question of jointmanship while the doctrine declares that a future conflict for the Indian armed forces will almost certainly involve joint operations, it does not, however, look at a unified command to realise this objective.Acknowledging the resistance of the IAF on that point, the doctrine proclaims that, “Air assets should never be parcelled out. If India is to achieve maximum military effectiveness with its limited resources, we must be fully aware of the dangers of dividing the asset of a potent instrument of national power — air power.” In the ultimate analysis, however, the doctrine avers that, “It must be recognised that invariably it is the human element that will prove to be decisive in war irrespective of the level of sophistication of equipment.”