It is the undeniable prerogative of a Prime Minister in a Cabinet system of government to ask for the resignation of a member of that Cabinet. Indeed, even considerations of natural justice may not inhibit this prerogative: a Prime Minister need not even assign reasons for seeking the resignation of a Minister. When reasons, however, are proferred for seeking the resignation of a Cabinet Minister, the latter has a beholden duty to Parliament and the people to contest these reasons if he considers them to be misconceived or specious.
The Prime Minister’s Office belatedly issued a public statement regarding the grounds for my dismissal. The action, the nation was informed, was taken in the interest of harmonious relations between the executive and the judiciary. The innuendo was unmistakable: the dismissed Law Minister had promoted disharmony between the two institutions.
Circumstances had already foreshadowed the PMO’s rationale. The immediate provocation was undoubtedly the Chief Justice of India’s outburst against certain ministers of the Vajpayee Government and indeed, the government itself, in open court during the course of the hearing of litigation pertaining to the implementation of the Srikrishna Commission report.
The Chief Justice was incensed that certain ministries had violated the principle of collective cabinet responsibility and castigated the government as being “uncivilised”. Although no names were mentioned, there was no doubt that the Chief Justice’s ire was primarily directed at the Law Minister.
The Chief Justice, with respect, was monumentally in error. The comments by myself and other ministers on the wisdom of prosecuting Bal Thackeray for a 1993 editorial were in no way connected with the proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. His Lordship ought to have realised that if the said prosecution of Thackeray was one of the recommendations of the Srikrishna report that was before the court, then, the state government which was seeking to prosecute Thackeray, and the Mumbai police who were contemplating his arrest even while the matter was pending in the Supreme Court, were all guilty of pre-empting the Hon’ble Court’s judgment.
Not only were the Chief Justice’s views legally untenable, but this conduct was most unbecoming of a judge. For one, it was injudicious of him to have relied upon newspaper reports when castigating persons who were not before him, for another, the folly was compounded by the use of intemperate language: there was no warrant for describing the Union Government as “uncivilised”.
`No allegation of corruption against the Chief Justice’
There were only two other pending issues which I can conceive of between me and the Chief Justice that could have led the PMO to conclude that there was disharmony between the executive and the judiciary. In the event, I decided to lay the facts and correspondence pertaining to them before Parliament. There was no desire to level allegations of corruption against the Chief Justice.
The first pertained to a difference of opinion before the Chief Justice and myself over whether he had a right to be consulted on the appointment of the Chairman of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC), The Chief Justice raised this dispute after I had selected a retired judge, Shri B.M. Lall of the Patna High Court for the post. A letter was written by him while I was abroad to the Prime Minister objecting to this appointment without prior consultation with the Chief Justice. An interim reply was sent by the Prime Minister recording that prime facie the appointment did not require such consultation and that the Law Minister would deal with the matter on his return. On my return, there was an exchange of correspondence between myself and the Chief Justice.
The Chief Justice conceded that his original contention that the law mandated consultation with him was erroneous, but insisted that the spirit of the law required consultation. When I finally informed him that I could not concede to the Chief Justice’s right to be consulted, since both law and practice left the matter exclusively within the domain of the executive, he refused to swear Justice Lall in.
The correspondence indicates that my failure to concede the principle of consultation was the chief ground for his objection to Justice Lall’s appointment. I wonder, if failing to concede executive turf to the judiciary when the ground invoked by the latter for such concession is wholly misconceived, is tantamount to causing disharmony. After my departure from the Law Ministry, I understand that the Chief Justice has sworn in Justice Lall. The public has a right to know whether the principle of consultation by which the Chief Justice laid such great store has been conceded to him by the new Law Minister.
The second pertains to a representation sent to me by the Hon’ble President for my comments on the propriety of the Chief Justice and his family in the conduct of litigation pertaining to a land dispute with the State of Madhya Pradesh. On July 17, I had requested the Chief Justice to send me a note setting out the facts pertaining to the case. Earlier, he had discussed this case with me, but the facts had escaped my memory. My request was meant only to dispose of the petition sent to me by the President. I do not see how my conduct could have caused disharmony, unless there was an apprehension on the Chief Justice’s part that I would comment adversely against him.
Certain sections of the press and Parliament, however, have pilloried me for undermining the institution of the judiciary. In seeking to rebut the allegation of disharmony, I have only laid bare two possible bones of contention between myself and the Chief Justice. On the land dispute issue, I can only say that the matter was never introduced into the public domain by me but by others; that the published facts, if unrebutted, perturb me; and that if they do not perturb my critics, then their standards of judicial probity are diametrically opposed to mine.
`Soli Sorajbee’s role deeper than what appears to be’
This brings me to the role of my “friend”, Mr Soli Sorabjee. I suspect his role in the entire sordid episode to be much deeper than what appears on the surface. Let me, however, confine myself to his perfidy in court on June 1, when the Chief Justice vented his ire against me and my other ministerial colleagues. Contrary to his written protestations to me, Mr Sorabjee did not do justice either to me or the government on that day. When the Chief Justice expressed his distress at the lack of collective cabinet responsibility in open court, the Attorney General also responded that he was “equally distressed”. This was no defence of me, my ministerial colleagues or the government. This was pathetic concurrence with the Chief Justice’s erroneous views and indicated that the Attorney General had not read his brief or secretly relished his Lordship’s observations. In my opinion, this single act constitutes connivance at my dismissal.
Mr Sorabjee’s friends both within the government and in the press (Mr Kuldeep Nayar, for instance) have suggested that my pique against him arises out of the M.S. Shoes transaction. The surest way of exploding this mischievous thesis is to contrast his approach with mine on the issue. As far back as 1998, when Dr Subramaniam Swamy raised the issue, I wrote a letter to the CBI, asking them to register an FIR and interrogate me. I also informed them that I was waiving any technicalities that might impede such interrogation arising from the fact that I was a minister.
The matter was referred to Mr Sorabjee. He did not dispose it of for two years, and finally gave his opinion only in the last week of May this year. This only after I was retained in the Cabinet during the reshuffle in May. By that time, Mr Sorabjee had probably realised that the government did not consider the M.S. Shoes case as an impediment in my being a Minister. By sheer coincidence, the Chief Justice’s disputes with me commenced from June.
I have also been criticised for denigrating the Attorney General’s office. This is less than fair. I have most certainly publicly attacked Mr Soli Sorabjee, the individual for his conduct and motivations. If anyone has brought the office of the Attorney General into disrepute, it is Mr Sorabjee himself. There can be no warrant whatsoever for giving an opinion to the Hindujas the prime accused in the Bofors FIR which he himself drafted during Mr V.P. Singh’s regime. What compounds the folly of giving that opinion is that the Chief Law Officer of the Union of India gave an opinion which was adverse to the Union of India itself. It is my considered view that the opinion has seriously compromised the financial interest of the Union of India. Any government which has not realised this is unfit for office. Mr Sorabjee’s defence that he took permission of the then Law Minister; that the opinion was given to the Hinduja National Power Corporation Ltd and not to the Hindujas; that he only charged Rs 5,000 for theopinion, are all defences unworthy of his stature.
`I plead guilty to being intemperate’
There was an unholy conspiracy to remove me from office. I know three of the conspirators but I suspect there are others. The object of the conspiracy concerns the independence of the judiciary but I must let my “natural recklessness” rest there. I suspect that the frenzy on the government’s part to conceal the documents I had relied upon from public view stems not merely from the fact that they will nail the government lie on the reasons for my dismissal, but also because of a fear that they would expose a sordid conspiracy involving those at the highest levels of our institutions. That can be the only explanation for why a Government consisting of Messrs.
Vajpayee and Jaitley who were in jail during the Emergency and were the victims of censorship are indulging in censorship of the most unjustified kind. This is also the only explanation as to why a government which has only recently flaunted its liberal credentials by introducing the Freedom of Information Bill, now invokes the Official Secrets Act. I am confident, however, that the entire truth will see the light of day.
Critics accuse me of often being intemperate in tone and tenor. I plead guilty to this charge. In mitigation, I can only say that I am easily provoked by the speciousness of my foes and passionately stirred by my causes. I have no quarrel with those who would condemn me for my style, but I would deeply distrust the motives of those who would harp on my style only to ignore the issues which I have raised.