How reform Bill was tailored to suit Govt size

While the Bill incorporates the CRC’s proposal of doing away with the provision that recognised a split in a legislative party, it steers clear of the crucial recommendation that the power to adjudicate all defection-related disputes ‘‘should vest in the Election Commission instead of in the Chairman or Speaker of the House concerned.’’

The CRC headed by former chief justice of India M N Venkatachaliah suggested the transfer of this quasi-judicial power to the Election Commission because of its notorious misuse over the years by presiding officers of legislatures, often at the behest of whatever is the ruling party whether at the Centre or the state concerned.

Given the vagaries of coalition politics, the NDA Government appears to have decided to play it safe by ensuring that the power to decide defection disputes remains with its own political nominee, the speaker of the Lok Sabha. The BJP’s compulsion for disregarding the CRC’s recommendation in this regard is all the more evident in the vitally important but politically unstable state such as Uttar Pradesh.

Another major omission in the Bill pertains to the defection-related problem of oversized council of ministers. The CRC recommended that a ceiling on the number of ministers in a state or the Union government be fixed at the maximum of 10 per cent of the total strength of ‘‘the popular House of the Legislature.’’

Thus, going by the CRC’s report, the strength of the council of ministers at the Centre should not exceed 10 per cent of the strength of the Lok Sabha. This works out to a limit of about 55 ministers, which is is way below Vajpayee’s council of 76 ministers. In an obvious bid to save its face, the Government provided in the Bill that the ceiling shall be 10 per cent of both Houses, wherever the legislature is bicameral.

In a similar attempt to have the cake and eat it too, the Government totally ignored the CRC’s proposal to check ‘‘the practice of creating a number of political offices with the position, perks and privileges of a minister.’’

Besides stressing that the distribution of such largesse should be ‘‘discouraged,’’ the CRC said that the number of the political office holders with a ministerial rank ‘‘should be limited to two per cent of the total strength of the lower House.’’

The omission of this amendment in the Bill betrays the Government’s interest in retaining an unfettered discretion to accommodate disgruntled politicians as chairpersons of high-powered bodies, with ministerial trappings.