How rail safety is sabotaged

I recall, for instance, that some time in 1977-1978, there was an accident in which one person was killed and another grievously hurt in the early hours of a winter morning.

As I was climbing into the car to pick up the general manager (GM), I got a call from one of my colleagues informing me that this was a case of sabotage. I promptly told the caller not to talk about it but instead call up the Range DIG, who happened to be K.P.S. Gill.

In about an hour we were at the site and before the chief engineer could mumble his ‘the track can do no wrong’ mantra, the GM and I could make out that this was a case of rail fracture — much to the relief of the local DM. But by then the AIR news bulletin had announced that the accident was caused by sabotage.

The furious GM dictated a wireless message to the Railway Board to issue a telephonic denial. A letter of apology was promptly issued by the then railway minister, Madhu Dandavate, to the chief minister of the state.

While the cause of an accident is subject to the statutory inquiry, some vital features need to be kept in mind. The railway system has the best laid down procedures for this. Unfortunately, they are hardly followed.

For instance, when there are reports of anti-social activity, GMs are required to hold meetings with the chief secretaries and the director general of police of the respective states to draw up a plan of joint action.

The commission’s report is appropriately classified but the nation has a right to know the answers to some basic issues. For instance, in the case of the latest tragedy, we need to know when the GM of the Eastern Railway last held a meeting of this kind.

Had monsoon patrolling been ordered as laid down in the Engineering Code? If so, was there a super check and at which level? Were the patrolmen actually deployed or do they exist only on paper? Have the roster and the register been seized? Was there a speed restriction while approaching the bridge and was it followed? Has the speedometer of the locomotive been sealed? Had the coaches received intensive pit inspection? When were they last procured from the Integral Coach Factory at Perambur?

There are other questions too. When did any senior officer last undertake inspection of any section on this stretch at night on the footplate of the Rajdhani locomotive? While the relief operations cannot be faulted — the public expects far too much — did any of the 50-odd railway officials travelling on the train take charge of the situation?

What made the GM and his heads of department come by special train and not fly out in a specially requisitioned Indian Air Force aircraft? In fact, there is an increasing tendency to resort to this practice of taking the train.

In August 1998, after the horrible Gaisal tragedy occurred, killing 294 people, the GM reached long after the minister! And why shouldn’t he? In 1989, in an accident near Mughal Sarai, the GM and his team arrived late at night in a special train at the site of an accident that had occurred early in the morning. To add to the farce, the chairman of the Board publicly complimented the GM on his non-visit, lying through his teeth simply because the GM had found favour with the powers that be.

The commission of inquiry set up this time will certainly take into account some of the points raised here. But the outcome is predictable: after a spell of about a week, the minister will summon senior officers and treat them to well-rehearsed homilies on accountability, on handling the media, and generally warding off inconvenient questions. I know this because I have attended ten such meetings. The really guilty will then be promptly promoted. Maybe this time things will be different. Or maybe they won’t.

The writer was a senior railway officer