Hitting where it hurts

And these were irregular militia forces, even if with high levels of motivation, who displayed a willingness to sacrifice themselves in the attacks on the invading forces. Baghdad is the centre of gravity of the geography of power of Saddam Hussein regime and the Baath party. It is a modern city of almost 5 million people, badly battered by the wars and sanctions for more than a decade.

Although nearly three of the six Republican Guards Divisions have been badly mauled in the battles on the approaches to Baghdad, another three Divisions would no doubt provide defensive forces in the city.

In addition the Special Republican Guards, the security forces, Baath party cadres, and the Fedayeen forces all would add up to a sizeable defensive force. Besides its massive air power, American forces would finally be able to assemble nearly four Division size attacking force for the battle of Baghdad.

Historically few modern armies have engaged in urban warfare to capture cities like Baghdad. The lessons from the past may also not be entirely relevant, if for no other reason than that the times have changed and with that technology for fighting has also undergone change. But it is important to remember that by defining ‘‘unconditional surrender’’ as the political goal, the United States has given the war an absolutist dimension somewhat similar to that laid down by the Allies in Second World War.

The forces defending Baghdad are part of the regime and its political and internal security infrastructure. The option for those defending Baghdad would rest with either dying fighting the Americans, or surrender, possibly to be butchered by their own compatriots at the first opportunity.

Similar situations existed in the case of battles for Paris, Budapest and Berlin in the Second World War (the cases of Leningrad and Stalingrad fall in a different category).

In the case of Paris, the Allied encouraged the Germans to negotiate with the French resistance and surrender without having to fight for the city. By that time many of his military commanders were completely alienated from Hitler. The result was that Paris fell without a battle.

In some ways that situation can be compared with Basra today. It is likely that the southern city of 1.3 million may finally fall without the British forces having to street fight for its control. It is significant that even in smaller cities and towns like Nassiriya, Najaf, Karbala, Kut etc. resistance has been going on, even if sporadically. Unless the Americans have a plan similar to that for the fall of Paris, a battle for Baghdad appears inevitable.

In case of Budapest and Berlin, the attacking armies adopted different strategies. Russian forces laid a six-week siege of Budapest during the winter of 1944-45, pounding it with artillery barrages and aerial bombing till resistance had virtually collapsed.

While the Russian forces suffered few casualties, the civilian losses were extremely high, and generally assessed to be closer to that in Hiroshima. On the other hand, Russian forces under pressure of time to control the politically important city of Berlin, completely surrounded the city.

The battle-tested Russians had complete air superiority and massive artillery while the city was held by the defeated remnants of the German army. The Russian forces suffered nearly 90,000 dead and 300,000 wounded before they captured Berlin in a assault lasting three days.

US commanders, no doubt, would have studied these and other historical cases besides extensive war-gaming to evolve their strategy to capture Baghdad. Obviously, any commander would want to keep his casualties to the very minimum. But in the earlier cases, there was no television, no satellite communications systems, an international environment far less sensitive to brutalities of war, public emotionally reactive to a five-year long war with horrendous destruction including city bombings.

In today’s world, all fighting forces have to be sensitive to casualties and destruction of economic assets, not only of one’s own, but also of the adversary. At the same time, far more accurate precision strikes are possible with modern weaponry, especially from the air.

The results of a thousand bomber strategic strike of World War II can be achieved more effectively by a 4-aircraft strike with Mirage-2000 aircraft today. A whole array of sensors provides the eye in the sky from which the adversary cannot hide even at night. The American strategy, therefore, would seek to maximise their own strengths and exploit the vulnerabilities of the Iraqi forces.

Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, editorial consultant to The Indian Express, will analyse the war daily. Readers can send their queries to him at jasjitsingh@expressindia.com